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ABSTRACT
A case study was done describing the process of formulating
economic policy in a sub-state (herein called the 'little' state)
level of government. Based on the process by which economic
policy was formed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts during the
years 1975-80, the study set forth and evaluated three hypotheses
about the formulation of economic policy in a 'little' state.
The first hypothesis examined the motivation of elected
officials. Interviews with elected officials in Massachusetts
revealed that public officials are relatively autonomous from
various interest groups in society. An elected official's
greatest concern was pleasing voters who elected him or her to
office. But the business community had influence because their
existence guaranteed private section jobs and an adequate level of
public services demanded by the electorate. The second hypothesis
asserted that businesses have different needs and competed for
power. Evidence indicated that there was a relationship between a
firm's stage of development and its public sector demands.
Specifically, growth firms wanted different policies than
declining or marginal firms. The final hypothesis examined the
actual process by which economic policy was formulated. In
Massachusetts, economic policy was the result of a consensus
formed between the business community and members of different
interest groups. The object of the consensus was to implement
pro-business policies that pleased existing businesses located in
the state without alienating the electorate.
Thesis Supervisor:. Dr. Langley Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Business-Government Relations
The following is an examination of business-government
relations in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Using the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a case study, the research
describes and tests a structuralist theory of the 'little'
state.1
The subject of business-government relations is the focus
of considerable research. Numerous books and articles have
been written about the subject, often with vastly different
conclusions. Since a person's ideology is partially defined
by his or her view of the power of the business community in
the affairs of government, the debate is often vigorous.
Rarely, however, is the debate about the amount of power
vested in the business community; few people would deny that
the business community is the most influential interest group
in American society. Instead, the controversy is over the
characteristics of business power--in particular, the amount
of public policy controlled by the business community and the
absoluteness of that control.
1The 'little' state is a term for one of the fifty states
of the United States. It is called 'little' to separate it
from the Marxist term, the state, a reference to the nation-
state.
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It is possible to consider the debate as being in the
form of a triangle. The corners represent three views of
business-government relations with modified versions of each
along the sides. On one corner of the triangle are
"democratic optimists," or pluralists. Typified by writers
like Robert Dahl, they believe that business power in the
United States is relative--dependent upon the influence of
other interest groups; no group, they assert, has a monopoly
on access or power. 2 While business leaders can use their
considerable financial resources and social status in a com-
munity frequently to persuade public officials of their
positions, competing groups have similar potent resources,
expecially the power of the vote. Who is most influential,
then, depends upon the issue and the interest of competing
groups.
On the second corner of the triangle are a group of
neo-Marxists who believe that businesses' influence is
absolute. They are the "democratic pessimists," or instrumen-
talists like James O'Connor and C. Wright Mills who see an
incestuous relationship between business and government:
high-ranking public officials are either former business
leaders or individuals who, once in office, develop close
2 R.A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1961).
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alliances with members of the business community. 3 Such
officials have one overriding objective--to increase the pro-
fits of the capitalistic community. According to one version
of this model, public officials implement two types of
programs that assist business--state-financed public works or
services that lower the cost of labor or other inputs into the
production process, and social programs that maintain social
harmony in society by guaranteeing workers a minimum standard
of living.
On the last corner of the triangle are neo-Marxists who
believe that businesses' power is relative but significant.
They are called structuralists, political scientists like Fred
C. Block, who at one level accept the pluralist hypothesis
that government officials are independent from business
interest and, in fact, have separate goals. 4 For example,
structuralists maintain that business and government have dif-
ferent objectives. Business leaders want to maintain and
expand their level of profits, while public officials care
3james O'Connor, The Corporations and the State: Essays
in the Theory of Capitalism and Imperialism (New York: Har-
per Colophon Books, 1974), C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
4Fred C. Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes
on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Review" 33 (1968)
6-28; N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes
(London: New Left Books, 1973).
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only about staying in office. But structuralists also
hypothesize that the seemingly separate objectives are, in
fact, inseparable. For instance, public officials need econo-
mic prosperity because it means increased employment and firm
profits and additional state revenues, permitting the funding
of programs which please the electorate and ensure their
reelections. Yet, properity also depends upon the production
schedule of producers, which is a function of expected
profits. Thus, public officials must please the electorate
and advance programs and policies that increase profits in the
business community if they want to guarantee their re-elections.
Theoretical Framework
At the start, we will hypothesize that the structuralist
theory best explains the formation of state economic policy.
In doing so, we will build upon a particular version of struc-
turalism worked out by the sociologist, Fred Block. Although
Block wrote about the relationship between business and
government at the national level, his essay "The Ruling Class
Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," is
nonetheless relevant to the study of the 'little' state.
Block's essay has several themes. The first theme is the
relative autonomy between capitalists and state officials, a
relationship that grew out of their different motivations.
Individual capitalists, who are concerned with accumulating as
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much profit as possible for their own enterprises, have little
incentive to work together for the general advancement of the
free-market economy. As a result, it becomes necessary for
state officials, whose continued power rests on a health
economy, to implement programs and policies that ensure eco-
nomic prosperity. In certain cases, this means constituting
reforms that may be harmful to specific businesses, but which
improve the long-run prospects of the general economic
community. For example, many programs that were instituted
during the New Deal imposed unwanted restrictions on
businesses. As in other situations, the state could only
implement such programs by remaining relatively independent
from the business community.
Block does not infer from the state's relationship with
the private sector that the state engages in anti-business
behavior. Instead, Block's second theme describes the con-
ditions in the market-place economy that lead state managers
to ultimately serve the business community.
In actuality, public officials need to ensure their re-
elections, and continuation in power creates the conditions
that make the state dependent upon the capitalist community.
A prosperous business community has several critical
functions. It produces goods and services desired by
constituents. In addition, it employs citizens in jobs that
provide them with money to pay for these goods and services.
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Finally, a thriving private sector returns revenues to the
state that can be used to subsidize public programs demanded
by the citizenry.
But in his third theme, Block describes the basic contra-
diction in a democratic system. In response to electorate
demands, state officials will implement reforms, such as
increased protection of the worker, that have the added effect
of limiting the ability of enterprise to accumulate profit.
Even if reforms are not implemented, the threat of reforms
could make business leaders wary about future actions and
reduce their confidence in the economy.
Block believes that business confidence is a prerequisite
to economic prosperity. Business confidence leads to added
business investment, and increased employment and state
revenues. The lack of business confidence, on the other hand,
limits business production and creates an economic slowdown.
Clearly, state officials' ability to please the elec-
torate depends upon the presence of business confidence. But
improving businesses' outlook about the future means limiting
governmental actions that improve human conditions. This is
the paradox. Too much of a pro-business policy can anger the
electorate who will respond by voting representatives out of
office. At the same time, a policy that favors the electorate
at the expense of business can produce economic decline and
the same result.
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Block believes there are only short-term solutions to the
contradiction. For example, the pressure to maintain the pri-
vate sector's business confidence often turns reforms, like
public education, into mechanisms that facilitate the accumu-
lation of capital. Block also asserts that non-economic
reforms take place only during periods of economic
instability, when business confidence is already low and can-
not be further diminished.
The Model
The model tested in the succeeding pages assumes Block's
structuralist framework. But while adhering to Block's basic
themes--the relative autonomy of the state and the importance
of business confidence in the market economy--the theory that
follows differs in several respects. First, it eliminates
Block's assumption of monolithic interest groups, and instead
examines the implications of competing demands within groups
as well as between groups. Second, the model focusses on
policy decisions in small regions rather than the
nation-state, which means the inclusion of a spatial dimen-
sion to the framework. Third, the model assumes the impor-
tance of resolution or developing a unity among various
interest groups in the formulation of economic policy.
The model can be organized into four component parts:
(a) a description of state institutions; (b) a description of
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interest groups; (c) an examination of the relationship between
state institutions and interest groups and (d) an examination
of the contradictions inherent to governing.
(A) State Institutions
A part of any model that explains the formulation of
economic policy must be a description of state institutions.
There are a number of institutions at the state level
of government. They include the legislature, the judiciary
and the executive branch, especially the bureaucracy. In
addition, most states have a number of quasi-public
authorities, like port and turnpike authorities, with exten-
sive public powers.
Although people who work in state institutions have dif-
ferent organizations and goals, they have one common
objective--the desire to survive and, if possible, to expand
their powers. To survive means convincing the electorate of
the value of their organization. For example, elected offi-
cials must persuade voters that keeping them in office is in
their best interest. In turn, bureaucrats must convince
legislators that the continuation of their programs will bene-
fit their constituents.
But state institutions differ in a number of respects.
For example, their power to control state policies is unequal
-- in part, a function of their access to the budget. Elected
officials, who decide the budget, have more 'potential' power
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than bureaucrats, who depend upon elected officials to fund
their programs. In addition, administrators of programs that
do not affect state revenues, like prison programs, have less
power than officials in the tax or budget offices. Power is
also dependent upon goals. Legislators are expected to shape
public policy, while school administrators are expected to
train people to be productive members of society. Finally, the
power structure within similar institutions is likely to be
different. Sometimes, the decision-making process is quite
complex, as a result of custom and relationships. At other
times, the power is formalized in job descriptions.
(B) Interest Groups
For the purposes of the model, interest groups in the
'little' state are divided into two categories--those who are
part of the business community, and the electorate. There is
general agreement about each group's goals: the electorate
wants services and policies that improve their standard of
living, while business leaders prefer services and programs
that permit them to maximize their rate of profit.
Yet neither group is monolithic. Just as there appears
to be a general consensus, there are also disagreements.
Disagreements among the electorate, for example, can be
explained by class interests. Improving the standard of
living for poor people and rich people is likely to mean dif-
ferent programs. Often the programs conflict. The rich
-12-
prefer less taxation and services than the poor. The working
class, represented by the labor unions, may be opposed to ser-
vices demanded by minorities or those without jobs. The
middle class has its own agenda.
Business interests are also not immune from conflict. A
firm's needs is explained by its stage of development. There
are three stages in the lifespan of a business enterprise.
First is a firm's inception. Innovative firms are potential
establishments, not yet in existence, but with profitable pro-
duction techniques. Once established, most firms go through a
period of expansion. Under certain conditions, growth firms
can acquire market power, sometimes developing into conglo-
merates or multinationals that create barriers to entry for
other firms. Those that do not will eventually compete with
enterprises that have technologically superior production
techniques. As a result, growth firms will become inefficient
or marginal. This is the last stage of development. Some
marginal firms are bought by conglomerates and multinationals.
Others become stagnant or decline; they close down or their
owners decide to keep producing at lower profit rates.
A firm's ability to grow, and thus its stage of
development, is dependent upon factors that are associated
with geographical locations. In the short run, the growth of
a firm in a state may be due to non-economic factors, like the
quality of life in an area or the unwillingness to leave a
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familiar environment, as well as economic factors, like plen-
tiful natural resources or labor. But in the long run, a
firm's growth in a particular state is dependent upon the
state's ability to offer a comparative advantage--some com-
bination of inexpensive inputs or accessible markets that give
a firm an economic advantage over other companies making simi-
lar products in another part of the country.
Comparative advantage is a dynamic, self-equilibrating
mechanism. Initially, a firm's comparative advantage will
result in lower prices and additional demand for its product.
But the additional demand will increase a firm's output and
eventually reduce the marginal productivity of factors,
pushing up the cost of inputs until there is an equalization
of factor prices between regions.
In other words, a comparative advantage is a temporary
benefit experienced by growth firms located in a particular
region. For example, as long as a 'little' state contains a
comparative advantage for a certain type of industry, such as
the high technology industry, that industry will locate and
expand there. But in doing so, input costs will rise as addi-
tional demands are placed upon the same resources and a
state's comparative advantage will lessen.
What then happens to growth firms? If the problem is
expected to be short-term or owners of a company believe that
small profit margins or limited opportunities elsewhere make it
impractical to relocate, firms may stay in the same location.
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Other firms may expand part of their operations elsewhere.
Finally, a number of establishments may close operations or be
purchased by other companies.
Since innovative firms are not yet in existence, they are
only theoretically interesting in a research document about the
formulation of economic policy. At any point in time, there
are really only two types of firms operating in a 'little'
state--expanding growth firms and inefficient marginal firms.
Some firms will not bother with state policies, while others
will get involved and advocate for public policies that
improve their terms of trade or comparative advantage.
In comparison with class interests for constituents, the
predicting variable that explains business demands on the
public sector is stage of development. Table I provides
examples of business demands. For instance, growth firms demand
public policies that eliminate bottlenecks and make expansion
less expensive. They ask the 'little' state for programs that
reduce the cost of resources, especially the supply of
suitably train workers, that improve the transportation system,
and that provide capital for expansion.
Marginal firms, on the other hand, simply want to
survive. To offset their inefficiencies, marginal firms
demand programs that reduce their cost of doing business and
allow them to compete with firms that produce the goods at a
lower cost. Examples of such programs are tax incentives and
reduced unemployment compensation benefits.
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TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF BUSINESS DEMANDS
GROUP
Growth Business
Sector
GENERAL OBJECTIVES
Improve Comparative
Advantage:
1) Increase supply
of labor
2) Increase the
supply of capital
+----------------
i i SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
Labor
Limit unemployment
compensation benefits
Increase job training
Improve school system
Taxes
Lower personal taxes
(income taxes) for
skilled labor
Finance
Publicly subsidized
loan and equity grants
3) Increase develop- Regulations & Laws
ment
Minimize all business
regulations
Minimize land develop-
ment regulations
4) Improve transpor-
tation networks
Build airports, new
highways, better seaports
-16-
TABLE I (Continued)
Marginal Business Maintain Existence
Sector
1) Lower cost of Labor
doing business
Lower unemployment and
workmen compensation
benefits
Keep minimum wage low
Taxes
Lower business taxes
Increase business tax
incentives
Lower property taxes
Regulations & Laws
Eliminate regulations
that increase cost
of doing business
(health and safety
regulations, environ-
mental, etc.)
Finance
Subsidize loan funds
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Relations Between the State and Interest Groups
Obviously, state officials, whose primary objective is to
stay in office, must be prepared to satisfy the electorate who
vote them into office. Since most officials want to remain in
the public sector indefinitely, this means they must plan to
satisfy the present and future needs of the electorate.
Satisfying present-day voters requires both ensuring a
healthy private sector to employ the citizenry and collecting
and dispersing public funds in a manner that pleases the
majority of the electorate. There is less that can be done to
gain the support of people who vote in future elections. One
concrete step that can be taken is proposing policies today
that will guarantee the future prosperity of the economy and,
with it, jobs and state revenues.
Several complications, however, make elected officials'
jobs difficult, if not impossible. The foremost difficulty is
the need to decide which of the many demands shall be
satisfied. While state officials consider the needs of voters
as primary, voter demands differ. More important, there is a
critical difference between voters and constituents. Voters
are constituents. But elected officials also consider consti-
tuents to be any group or individual that assists them to get
re-elected. In this respect, a certain segment of the busi-
ness community--the marginal sector--is likely to be more
valued as constituents than as future employers.
For example, although the marginal sector of a 'little'
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state's economy may be significant in size, most of its
influence is derived from the relationships the sector has
built up over the years with state officials. Through these
relationships marginal businesses have become business consti-
tuents who provide state officials with several important
services--technical assistance to help then understand
legislation and campaign funds at election time. Not all
businesses, however, are valued as constituents. In
comparison, growth firms are valued for their promise of
future expansion and thus the part they will play to ensure
prosperity, employment, and future state revenues.
The role of state officials is to effect a consensus
among the various electorate and business interests.
Because of disunity, they must remain relatively separate from
conflicting interest groups, with their own policies. The
object of all action, of course, is to stay in power. But
achieving this objective means resolving inherent
contradictions. For instance, capital flows easily between
regions, and care must be taken to nurture firms so
that they remain and expand in the 'little' state. But a
policy that favors firms at the expense of the electorate
could anger voters and jeopardize a favorable vote in
the next election. Yet, a policy that favors present voters
over firms (especially groth firms) can lead to reduced
revenues and unhappy future voters and losses in upcoming
elections. To make matters worse, a policy of concensus
will often as not lack clear purpose and lead to dissatisfied
voters who will grow weary of unsuccessful programs and
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either demand reduced public spending or a new group of
appointed and elected officials.
The Hypotheses Tested
The research will examine three hypotheses set forth in
the model:
I. Elected officials are relatively autonomous from the
business community. Their major objective is to
develop public policy that serves present and future
populations of the electorate. But, to do so, they
must differentiate between firms. One group of firms
that need to be pleased--growth firms--guarantee
future prosperity and thus future elections. Another
Another group--marginal firms--are valued consti-
tuents who, with voters, ensure a public official's
current election.
II. Businesses' demand for public programs is a function
of their stage of development. Not only do business
interests compete for the power to influence public
policy, but their access is initially unequal.
Growth firms are inherently valued by politicians.
In comparison, marginal firms must become politi-
cally active to receive favored treatment.
III. Economic policy is the outcome of a consensus between
different interest groups. They are several diacho-
tomies in the system. First is the conflict between
special interests among the electorate. Second is
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the diachotomy between the demands of the electorate
and members of the business community. Finally is
the conflict between members of the business com-
munity in various stages of development. The objec-
tive of consensus in economic policy is to satisfy
the needs of the various segments of the business
community in a manner that does not anger the
electorate.
The empirical research that will test these hypotheses
covers a four year period, representing Democratic Michael
Dukakis' only term as governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Over fifty interviews were conducted with
public and private officials in a two-year span that included
the end of the Dukakis administration and marked the beginning
of Democratic Governor Edwared King's tenure. Another twenty-
five interviews were held during the fall of 1980 to obtain
further information. In addition, all post World War II
legislative and administrative records dealing with state
economic policy, located in the Massachusetts State Library,
were examined.
The research examines both the general process by which
elected officials in Massachusetts formulate general public
policy and the formation of a specific policy. A critical
issue in research methodology involving business-government
relations is finding an appropriate policy to study. There
are two requirements--that it must be a substantive area of
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public policy which also engages the interests of business and
government representatives. For example, most business
leaders are unconcerned about the direction of criminal
justice policy. Studying business-government relations in the
formation of criminal justice policy, then, could either be a
wasted effort or, worse, lead to the erroneous conclusion that
business is unable to influence the direction of criminal
justice policy.
In theory, at least, economic policy should avoid this
dilemma. Clearly, government officials care about economic
programs that are designed to induce prosperity and expand the
public treasury. In addition, the private sector's attitude
about economic programs and prosperity is likely to be more
complex. On the positive side, prosperity brings with it
additional wealth and a greater demand for consumer products.
While business leaders should support this result, they are
opposed to the added competition for resources, which will
likely increase their input costs.
But while the problem of a lack of business involvement
is eliminated by choosing economic policy as the topic of
study, there is the counterargument that since the subject
most concerns the business community, the results might be
biased the other way and wrongly indicate that the business
community controls public policy. But this bias is not
likely. First, economic policy does not just concern the
business community. Instead, it often involves changing laws
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and programs that were originally designed to protect workers
and other constituents. But even if business were the only
group involved in economic policy, it is wrong to presume that
involvement always leads to control. Indeed, there are
numerous examples at the federal level in which public offi-
cials have looked beyond the short-run interests of individual
capitalists to design economic reforms to meet the long-range
needs of the economy. To give just a few examples, businesses
opposed the federal anti-trust legislation that was passed in
1890 to ensure the continued health of the capitalistic system
in this country. They were also against the wage-price
controls instituted by President Nixon between 1971-74 to
control inflationary pressures in the early seventies.
There is, however, a serious conceptual difficulty asso-
ciated with the study of economic policy. Specifically, how
do we define economic policy? If we say that economic policy
is a set of programs influencing consumption and expenditure
patterns, then all public actions, which either alter tax bur-
dens or expenditure patterns, can be classified as economic
policy. While theoretically satisfying, the definition pre-
sents a practical problem. Accepting the "democratic
pessimists" assumption that the purpose of all public programs
is to advance the interest of capitalists implies that
programs with 'official' non-economic objectives have the same
characteristics as those programs that have the primary purpose
of altering economic conditions. To give an extreme example,
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grants to the arts would be analyzed in the same way as public
employment programs.
The problem can be solved by only studying programs that
have the explicit purpose of improving economic conditions in
the state. The criteria of acceptance then becomes one of
intent: is a major purpose of a program to improve the
state's economic conditions?
By defining economic policy in this manner, it is
possible to confine the study to three types of programs: (a)
business promotion policy--programs originally designed to
attract new businesses to the state7 (b) business tax policy--
laws designed to 'equitably' tax existing businesses into the
state and (c) environmental and labor policies--programs
designed for other purposes but which have recently incor-
porated specific economic objectives.
But why base a study on economic policy on events in
Massachusetts? In response, there are certain advantages to
examining the Commonwealth. Up to now, the subject of contem-
porary state economic policy has been almost completely
ignored by public policy scholars. Much, however, has been
written about the Massachusetts economic policy before the
industrial revolution. Thus, background information provides
perspective to the study. Equally important, the state was one
of the first to be industrialized.5 While its exact history
5See Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth:
A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
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is unique, its long-term transformation from an agricutural-
based economy to productive manufacturing to service sector to
high technology is likely to be duplicated in other younger
states. To some extent, then, learning about Massachusetts
might be akin to looking into a "crystal ball" that can pro-
vide guidelines to less mature states concerning their futures.
Past Research
Since the subject of post-war state policy has received
minimal attention from scholars, there is very little tradi-
tion to draw upon in doing this research. Most of what has
been done is the work of political scientists only
peripherally interested in the question of business-government
relations and state economic policy. Their main endeavor has
been to explain the general voting patterns of state
legislators.
The result of their research is of minimum value in pro-
viding a framework for this study. In addition, there is the
added complication that there is no unanimity of findings in
these past works. For example, several published studies
conclude that party affiliation is the most significant
variable explaining state legislators' voting records. 6 But,
6John Wahlke, William Buchanan, Heinz Evlan and Leroy
Ferguson, "American State Legislators' Role Orientation Toward
Pressure Groups," Journal of Politics 22 (1960) pp. ,
William Keefe, "Comparative Study of the Role of Political
Parties in State Legislatures," Western Political Quarterly 9
(1956): 535-41.
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at least two prominent political scientists, V.0. Key and
Thomas Dye, dispute this conclusion. Dye believes that a
state's degree of urbanization and its population's average
income and educational levels explain legislative actions. 7
Another researcher, Richard Hofferbert, believes that specific
factors, such as the availability of resources in a state, its
geographical location and its political and economic history,
provide better clues toward understanding today's legislators.
8
To further complicate the matter, few political scien-
tists agree about the importance of interest groups in the
decision process; some say that they have minimum
significance, while others indicate either considerable
influence or influence that varies from state to state and
group to group. 9
There is more consistency when focusing on research done
on the state of Massachusetts. Studies on the legislative pro-
cess in the state have repeatedly described the importance of
party allegiance in voting decisions. In a post-World War II
7 Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co., 1966).
8 Richard Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in State Policy
Formation," Politics 3 (1970): 316-344.
9 Harmon Ziegler, Interest Groups in American Society
(Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1964); James S. Lee, "Toward an
Understanding of State Legislative Decision Making," in
Dimensions in State and Urban Policy Making, eds: Richard
Leach and Timothy O'Rourke (New York: MacMillan and Co.,
1975).
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research project by Malcolm Jewell, for instance, over 90 per-
cent of the legislative roll-call votes were attributed to
party allegiances.1 0 Later examination by Duane Lockard
concluded that there was unusual party cohesion during the
period of Jewell's study, but that party cohesion was still a
strong force four years later.l1
In the same study, Lockard named the interest groups most
closely associated with the state's Republican and Democratic
parties. Not surprisingly, manufacturing, public utilities
and real estate interests clustered around the Republican
party and the labor unions had a home in the Democratic Party.
A 1965 examination of lobbyists in four states, including
Massachusetts, evaluated the perceived abilities of interest
groups to affect legislative decisions. 1 2  Legislators in the
state of Massachusetts named labor unions as the most powerful
lobbying group with trade and business associations fifth,
after insurance, education and financial institutions.
Lobbyists who were questioned agreed that labor had the most
influence, but placed business interests in a slightly higher
position, third on the scale of power. At the same time, only
lOMalcolm Jewell, "Party Voting in American State
Legislatures," American Political Science Review 49 (1955):
773-79.
llDuane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959.
1 2Lockard, New England State Politics, p. 156.
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twenty percent of those Massachusetts legislators who
completed the interview would admit that a lobbyist's view
could make then change their vote on any particular issue.
The Outline
The research is in five chapters. The second chapter
examines the role of state officials. Through interviews con-
ducted with over forty legislators and the governor, it
describes the attitudes elected officials have about the for-
mulation of public policy. The third chapter focusses on the
business community. The object of this chapter is to understand
the role of business competition in the formulation of public
policy. The chapter examines the types of businesses involved
in state government, the reasons for their involvement and the
method of their involvement. Chapter four and five detail the
contradictions and conflicts that are part of the process of
formulating specific public policies. The chapter emphasizes
the importance of concensus in the development of four speci-
fic economic policies--taxes, business promotion, labor and
the environment. The final chapter summarizes the findings.
CHAPTER II
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Introduction
How do elected officials in the 'little state' formulate
public policy? Are they aware of the conflicting need to
maintain prosperity while satisfying the electorate?
Through two sets of interviews, conducted in the fall of
1978 and in the fall of 1980, state legislators in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts were asked to discuss the pro-
cess by which they formulated public policy. The chapter exam-
ines both the general process of policymaking and the speci-
fic factors considered by legislators in deciding economic
policy.
The State Legislature
In order to understand the motivation of elected
officials, it was first necessary to describe the institution
in which they work. The Massachusetts legislature, officially
named the Great and General Court and referred by most as the
General Court or simply the "Hill," is the oldest state
legislature in the country. Once a body of men elected by
church members, the legislature in 1978 consisted of forty
Senators and one hundred and sixty Representatives, who, with
rare exception, were civilians, elected by the general
populace. Many--one-half of the Senators and one-third of the
Representatives--had no other employment except politics.
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Those who had other jobs were frequently lawyers with a
part-time practice that permitted them time to attend to
their public functions.
People became legislators for three reasons--prestige,
power, and idealism. But not money: except for leadership
positions, it was not a well-paid job. For example, the 1978
salaries of legislators, which was set by law, was less than
$15,000. In addition, legislators received daily travel
expenses, which ranged from $2.00 to $32.00 per day.
Most of the members of the 1978 legislative session were
Democrats in their mid-forties. Newly elected legislators
tended to be younger than those with seniority. Almost all
had at least a college degree and many also had a master's
degree or additional professional training. Most were white
males.
The state constitution guaranteed citizens the right of
free petition. As a result, the General Court was usually in
session for most of the year, considering the more than seven
thousand bills filed by Massachusetts citizens. Until
recently, every bill was given a public hearing by one of the
24 standing joint committees. While Representatives were
usually appointed to several standing committees, Senators
were often appointed to as many as five or six committees with
responsibility for subjects ranging from energy to commerce
and election laws. Most Democratic Senators also served as
committee chairpersons.
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The Basic Factorsl
Obviously, we needed to go beyond the general statistic
and statement to ask modern day legislators specific questions
about economic policy. In so doing, we found the theme of
electorate needs central to explaining elected officials'
behavior. In particular, legislators' own views were secon-
dary to the need to please the electorate; legislators were
more concerned that their votes on major social and economic
legislator be consistent with the views of the electorate than
that they represent personal ideologies or the opinions of
party leaders:
My job is to represent the interest
of the district as I see it.
My personal point of view is secondary. I
will try to convince my constituency if I
feel strongly about personal views but I
will usually mirror constituency opinions.
Even when considering so-called 'business legislation,'
electorate needs were primary. For instance, legislators
supported legislation that assisted business enterprise in the
state. A number had no explanation for their attitudes.
Those who did, however, supported pro-business policies
1Most of the material covered in the subheading Basic
Factors was the result of interviews conducted during the
fall, 1980. Nineteen state legislators were asked a series of
predetermined questions in interviews held at the state
legislature. A more detailed analysis of the interviews is
provided in Appendix I at the end of this chapter.
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because they helped to expand the economy and increased state
revenues, making it possible to serve the electorate who
wanted jobs and public services:
There is a limit to how much government can provide
in services and in employing people without a
healthy economic base from which to derive a tax
revenue. Most people are best served by the economy
in which they are gainfully employed.
I favor pro-business policies if it increases jobs
and small business and broadens the tax base but I
do not favor big business at the expense of the
public.
Although different legislators supported different pro-
business policies, there was a concensus that the effec-
tiveness of each policy lay in its ability to improve the
state's business climate. A bad business climate, caused by
anti-business public policies, limited the economic growth in
the state and created the conditions of unemployment and
inflation. At the other end, a positive business climate, a
function of pro-business policies, induced business expansion,
which made revenues expand, and employment grow in the state.
However, legislators were unclear about how to measure
the state's business climate. The condition of the economy
was not a factor. When first interviewed in 1978, during a
period when the unemployment rate was 6 percent, equal to the
national average, several legislators believed the state had a
bad business climate. They based their views on what
industry said about the business climate. But industry was a
hazy term to legislators, not well-defined. A typical
-32-
legislative response in 1978 was:
I am told the state doesn't have a good
business climate. Industry perceives the
state as anti-business.
Another legislator in 1978 believed that the business
climate was a ". . . state of mind." Still others measured the
business climate by the amount of pro-business policies: the
more programs that helped business (often undefined), the
better the business climate. Sample comments of this type
were:
A good business climate is one where govern-
ment implements taxation policies and environ-
mental regulations such that they were compet-
itive with those of other states.
A good business climate would involve giving
tax breaks to big business.
There was further ambiguity in legislators' thinking
about economic policy. On the one hand, legislators were
unconcerned about which type of businesses the policies affected.
No matter whether the policies assisted expanding or stagnant
enterprise, the business climate was improved as long as some
segment of the business community benefitted. At the same
time, most legislators understood that businesses served dif-
ferent purposes in the state. Some, like the older manufac-
turing companies, once the 'back-bone' of the Massachusetts
economy, were important present-day employers who might not be
existing in a decade or so. Others, like high technology
firms, were critical to the state's future economy. With few
exceptions, Commonwealth legislators in 1980 believed that the
growth of the Massachusetts economy was linked to the growth of the
-33-
high technology industry in the state:
Older firms are the work-horses: the steady
industries that form the back-bone. High
technology firms are producing products of
the future. They will grow and flourish.
The [high technology] firms are extremely
important to the Massachusetts economy. The
only resource that we as a Commonwealth have
is our minds and educational facilities. The
ability to produce in the high technology
field has to be fostered; the work is critical.
Only a few legislators expressed reservations about the
increasing importance of the high-technology industry. A
state representative thought that the state should not pro-
mote high-technology industry because it will lead to less eco-
nomic diversity and perhaps to a one industry state--both
questionable results. In addition, a state senator questioned
whether high technology firms will continue to expand in the
Commonwealth. He had more faith in the older industrial firms
that have been doing business in the Commonwealth for a number
of years:
I wouldn't want to say that one or another
group is critical to the present; I'm not
even sure that high technology firms are
critical to the future economy. I question
whether the growth rate of high technology will
continue. It seems that it will slack off.
Furthermore, other states will be looking for
more higher paying jobs. High tech firms
will move as other states offer incentives.
Older industrial firms have already been shaken
out. Those that have remained are likely to
continue to stay in Massachusetets. Their
potential for the future is quite substantial.
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Another reason legislators did not discriminate between
types of pro-business programs was that few thought that
voters particularly cared about their actions in this area of
public policy. Legislators did not believe, for example, that
endorsing specific laws that benefitted business would in any
way affect their political futures; they assumed that voters
were not particularly knowledgeable about specific pieces of
business legislation and consequently did not make it an issue
in political campaigns. As one state representative said:
. . . supporting [business] sponsored legis-
lation does not help me get re-elected because
most people do not know about it. Getting re-
elected depends upon whether the legislature
works and the economy grows.
But this did not mean that relations between business and
voters were conflict free. Rather, the conflict was on a dif-
ferent plane--more general than specific. Each group had
different goals which resulted in a difference of opinion
about fundamental policies and programs. Business wanted fewer
taxes and government intervention and voters generally wanted
more services. While legislators sometimes took different
sides in this conflict, their analyses of the nature of the
conflict between the two groups were remarkably consistent:
The conflict [between business and constituents]
is inevitable because groups see problems from
different perspectives. Business groups are
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oriented toward the free market system, letting
a healthy economy create jobs. Social and labor
groups want more government involvement to ensure
employment and benefits which lead to increased
regulations and decreased profitability of busi-
ness.
The conflict between business and the electorate
is inevitable because businesses spend all their
energy and time trying to get resources that they
don't have to pay for. The nature of business is
exploitative.
Several legislators sympathized with businesses' position
in this conflict. For instance, one senator complained that
voters were insensitive to the fact that limiting businesses'
ability to make profits will lead to increased prices and
layoffs and eventually ". . . a smaller tax base and fewer
jobs." A few others argued that, while they understood the
necessity to have companies operating in Massachusetts, the
legislature represented the general public and not business.
Still, most believed that their job was not to take sides but
to ". . . minimize the conflict between business and the elec-
torate by trying to moderate the clashes between the two
parties."
Understanding the Economy
Since the desire for economic prosperity was so great, it
should follow that legislators would be knowledgeable about
the state's economy. A sample of thirteen members of the
House and seven members of the Senate were questioned about
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their understanding of the economy during the fall of 1978.2
There were two ways to evaluate a state legislator's
knowledge about economic events: through self-perception and
from an evaluation of what they know. In the case of the
sample, all but three legislators considered themselves more
knowledgeable than the average legislator about economic
matters. The remaining three said that their knowledge was
about average.
The legislators were asked to discuss the conditions
of the state and national economies during the period of the
interview and to evaluate how each economy has been changing
over time. Not surprisingly, politicians generally understood
what was happening to the national economy. For example, the
majority of state legislators agreed that inflation was the
biggest economic problem facing the country in 1978. Like
economists, however, their explanations for inflation
differed. Some believed that inflation was the fault of big
unions; some blamed government spending. The largest number,
however, attributed the rise in prices to increasing inter-
national oil prices.
Legislators saw little difference between national and
state economic conditions. When asked, eleven of the nineteen
legislators interviewed in 1978 either said that inflation and
2 Appendix II at the end of this chapter includes addi-
tional data from the interviews.
-37-
unemployment were also problems in the state or more
accurately, that the state economy was in the same condition
as the national economy.
Even though they believed that there was little dif-
ference between the state and national economies, there was
a great difference in their perception of the problems of the
two economies. The concensus was that the state's economic
problems were caused by inappropriate government actions at
the state level rather than international or national trends.
Although one-fourth of those interviewed attributed a part of
the state's economic problem to the high cost of energy and
transportation in the region, most claimed that high state
taxes and government spending created the situation the state
was in.
What made legislators blame the state's economic dif-
ficulties only on the public sector? One reason could be that
there was little media or academic attention given to state
problems. As a result, views about local business conditions
were formed, not from expert opinions, but from legislators'
own feelings about the economy or from the opinions expressed
to them by business people residing in their legislative
districts. Further, legislators believed that there was a
relationship between the state's economy and its business
climate. The poorer the climate, caused by anti-business
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public policies, the worse the economic conditions.
Public Parties and Public Policies
Up to now, there has been no attempt to differentiate
between the policy positions taken by members of the
Democratic and Republican parties. It is commonly assumed,
for instance, that the Democrats represented the poor and the
working class and the Republicans stood for the right of capi-
talists to keep and increase their profits. First, the inter-
views revealed that there was a substantial commonality of
viewpoint. In addition, it is wrong to assume that there was
even more than relative differences in party platforms. For
example, party members in the Commonwealth have had a tradi-
tion of straying from traditional party philosophies.
There were a number of instances in the past when
Massachusetts Democrats chose a "Republican" solution to a
problem. During the early twentieth century, for example,
Democratic nominees for governor often advocated no expansion
in the public sector as a solution to a declining manufac-
turing base. One Democratic Governor, Joseph Ely, even
suggested cutting the salaries of public employees as the way
for the state to minimize the effects of increasing
unemployment.
Republican party member have done likewise. In fact, a
number of precedent-setting health and safety laws protecting
workers would not have been passed in Massachusetts in the
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early 1900's if a group of liberal Republicans had not decided
that business owners had too much control over workers and the
work place. In addition, while the Republican party has
espoused a philosophy of lean budgets and minimum government
spending, Republicans have never been reluctant to spend money
on capital improvements. In 1913, for example, when
Republicans controlled state politics, average per capita
spending in the state was $5.30, sixty percent above the
national average. While education, hospitals, charities, and
prisons accounted for one-half of the budget, twenty percent
of the revenues went to amortize principal and interest
payments for the new roads, seaports, and railroads. 3
Still, Democrats in the state have more often been advo-
cates of the needy. Some, like James Michael Curley, the
Democratic governor during the Depression, have been
innovators--demanding that there be unemployment compensation
for the unemployed, a state public works program, union wages
on public works projects, and a reduction of employee work
hours. While others have been more traditional, it was the
rare Democrat who did not advocate an expansion of social ser-
vices after the Depression.
For a number of years, the Democrats had to depend upon
support of rebel Republicans to implement their programs. Until
3Arthur Holcolmbe, State Government in the United States
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916) 308.
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1952, (the year that Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected
President of the United States) the Republicans had a majority
of both the House and Senate seats. From 1952 to 1958, the
two parties split control of the two houses. In 1958,
however, the Democrats gained control of both branches of the
legislature. That year, only sixteen of the forty Senate
seats were held by Republicans, and ninety-five Republicans,
compared to one hundred forty-five Democrats, were elected to
the House of Representatives.
Although the governor's office has never been controlled
by one party, the Democratic majority in the legislature has
successfully pressured Republican and Democratic governors to
provide more programs for working class and unemployed.
Between 1953 to 1969, a time when the legislature was changing
from Republican to Democratic control, general revenues collected
by the state increased by three hundred percent. State
spending reached its peak in the late sixties and early
seventies, when state and local expenditures were increasing
faster than the gross state product. Between 1962 and 1973,
for example, state and local expenditures increased from 10.3%
to 16% of gross state product.4
4 Robert Eisenmenger, Alice Munnell and Joan Poskanzer,
Options for Fiscal Structure Reform in Massachusetts, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, Research Report no. 57 (Boston,
1975), p. 29.
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Priorities clearly shifted during the Democrats' reign.
For instance, between 1957, the year before the Democrats
began to control the legislature, and 1976-77, the state
budget grew 480%. But during the same period, spending on
education increased 694%. In fact, Massachusetts apportioned
a larger percentage of state personal income, over two
percent, to public welfare, than any other state in the
union.5
Federal aid has helped to pay for the expanded social
services. But state and local taxes have also been
increasing--from 9.6 percent of personal income in 1963 to
14.8 percent of personal income in 1973, fifteen percent above
the national average.6
To have sufficient revenues, state officials made four-
teen permanent changes in the tax laws between the years 1959
to 1971. They voted to raise tax rates thirteen times. The
personal income tax rate was increased three times; the cor-
porate income tax rate was changed twice and a sales tax was
enacted. In addition, elected officials have passed numerous
temporary taxes, such as a surcharge on business and personal
5 U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Historical Statistics on Government Finances and Employment,
1977 Census of Governments, vol. 6, no. 4, Table 18, pp.
92-94. See also Michael Kieschnick, "State Business Tax
Incentices as a Tool for Industrial Development,"
(unpublished paper, 1980).
6Eisenmenger, et al., Options for Fiscal Structure, p. 12.
-42-
income tax. At one point, in the early fifties, it was esti-
mated that one-fourth of the entire state budget came from
temporary taxes.
By the 1970's, the individual income tax contributed two
times more to state funds than did the corporate income tax.
But the corporate tax, while providing only six percent of
state and local revenues, increased five-fold since World War
II. Although the corporate income tax rate remained relati-
vely constant in the last decade--8.3 percent--it was by 1980
the seventh highest state corporate tax rate in the country.7
Politicians React to the Changing Economic Base
Although politicians from both parties had different
perspectives about the ideal amount of electorate programs
and tax burden, they shared similar attitudes about economic
decline--that state government was somehow to blame for any
down turn in the economy.
In fact, three events were taking place at the same time
in the Commonwealth. Two of the events--the emergence of the
Democratic Party as the majority party in the legislature and
the increasing tax burden--have been described. There can be
several interpretations to the third event--the state's
7 The five states with single based higher rates were
California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
and Deleware. The District of Columbia also had a higher cor-
porate income tax rate. In addition, Arizona, Iowa and North
Dakota had progressive rates that exceeded Massachusetts at
the top income.
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declining economic base. One interpretation is that the
state's transformation from a manufacturing-based to service-
based economy and the resultant unemployment created the con-
ditions for the Democratic party to take control of state
politics and implement expensive public programs that eased
the hardships for workers but increased the cost of
government. An opposing interpretation, generally held by
politicians from both parties, was that the rising tax burden,
due to the expansion of government, created a poor business
climate and the loss of manufacturing employment.
But, in reality, the Commonwealth was not the only poli-
tical entity losing manufacturing jobs. In fact, manufac-
turing employment has been declining in importance in the U. S.
economy. But the loss of manufacturing jobs has been
greater in the state; for instance, employment in manufacturing
has been declining relatively in the country but absolutely in
the Commonwealth.
The reduction in the state's industrial employment has,
in fact, accelerated as a result of recent cutbacks of federal
defense spending. One study estimated that as many as twenty
percent of the state's work force lost their jobs in the early
seventies because of the decline of defense contracts in the
Commonwealth. Another concluded that the loss of defense
contracts in the state over the last three decades has had an
-44-
enormous impact on the economic growth of the area:
Since the 1950's, the Northeast and Midwest
have lost a disproportionate share of defense
spending and now receive a lower level of
military expenditures than any other area of
the country. Defense spending has an impor-
tant impact on the economic growth of an area.
Declining expenditures increase unemployment,
exacerbate already identifiable economic prob-
lems, and encourage the shift of economic
growth to other areas. 8
But the reduction in manufacturing jobs has not been
limited to defense-related industries. Rather, the largest
drop in employment has occurred in marginal industries that
have been in the state the longest--apparel, leather and
leather goods. To offset this trend, a small group of tech-
nically oriented firms have increased their employment. In
addition, the service sector has been growing at a healthy
rate; between 1963 and 1973, eighty-nine percent of all new
jobs in the state were in service firms. 9
Still, to the average state official, who believed that
manufacturing was the base of state's economy, on which the
health of other sectors depended, the state's economy
appeared sluggish and unstable. He or she noticed that
past state unemployment rates have been moderately higher
8 Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, The State of
the Region (Washington: Northeast-Midwest Congressional
Coalition, 1979) 31. See also A. D. Little, Inc., Fostering
Industrial Growth in Massachusetts, Massachusetts Department
of Commerce, Vol. No. I (Boston, MA, 1970), pp. 2-3.
9 Donald Stone, Service Sector Growth: Its Implications
for the Massachusetts Economy and Federal Base Redevelopment,
Joint Commission on Federal Base Conversion (Boston, 1975), p.
24.
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than the national average and that there have also been six
business cycles--periods of recession and then growth--since
World War II. 1 0 Although the local cycles have paralleled
national cycles, and, in fact have been less severe in
Massachusetts than in the country as a whole, the local manu-
facturing sector experienced greater declines in income and
employment than the service sector during these downturns.
1 1
Public officials' attitudes about the Commonwealth's eco-
nomy and their own part in it became even more negative after
the recession of 1974-75. During that year unemployment rose
by fifty percent. Except for the Great Depression, there were
more people out of work than at any other time. For the first
time, the state's recession was considerably worse than the
country's. The local unemployment rate was 11 percent, thirty
percent higher than the national average. State revenues
dropped considerably. Welfare spending increased.
The new Democratic governor, Michael Dukakis, who had run
on a platform of restoring economic prosperity in the state,
had an economic crisis comparable to the Depression. There
were signs that banks were worried about the state's financial
balance sheet and would refuse to buy its bonds. By the
1 0 Lynn E. Browne, "Regional Industry Mix and the Business
Cycle," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston November-December (Boston, 1978) pp. 35-54.
llStone, Service Sector Growth, p.50.
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spring of 1975, the governor, who had promised no new taxes,
was forced to ask the legislature to pass the largest tax
increase in the Commonwealth's history to balance the state's
budget. Yet, even this action could not stop the rumors that
the state could be going into bankruptcy.
What was happening to the Commonwealth's economy? Was it
getting progressively worse? State officials were concerned.
One reporter observed that the psychological impact of the
recession was significant and long lasting:
. . . the psychological impact of all this
was almost as serious as the damage on the
balance sheet and has proved to be longer
lasting. Through 1975, anyway, the state
seemed unable to respond to the crisis
effectively and the business community did
not seem so inclined. About as constructive
a move as many businessmen at the time--led
by bankers and insurance executives--could
or would manage was the raucous orchestra-
tion of the cry that Massachusetts is a rot-
ten place to do business in.12
Although the economy soon improved, elected officials
from both parties had not forgotten the crisis of 1975. Many
of them worried about the state's economic future. Had they
caused the crisis by increasing the tax burden on business or
redistributing the wealth too much? Had their social objec-
tives caused the decline of the manufacturing community? Were
1 2 Robert Turner, "Massachusetts in 1980," Boston Globe,
10 February 1980, p. 37.
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economic conditions likely to worsen? Most important, what
could they do to prevent another recession like the one in
1975?
The Legislative Leadership's Role
Because legislative leaders assumed powerful roles in the
Commonwealth, it is important to understand the influence they
had in formulating the state's economic policy. There was no
more important position in the state legislature than the
Senate President or Speaker of the House. They decided the
make-up of all standing committees and commissions of the
legislature. They appointed colleagues to chair committees
and to participate in other leadership positions. They allo-
cated office space and staff. Finally, their favor or dis-
favor meant the difference between bills getting through or
not getting through the legislature.
In 1978, the Senate President was a former high school
teacher. A state Senator for two decades and Senate President
for seven years, Kevin Harrington was the first Democratic
chairman of what was the forerunner of the Commerce and Labor
Committee, the chief economic policy-making committee. In
those early years, he was a "bread and butter" Democrat, a
friend of labor, the infirmed, and the needy. Likewise, he
was suspicious of business and business interests.
Thomas McGee, appointed Speaker of the House in 1975, had
a similar background. He grew up in the adjoining city to the
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Senate President and, like him, was a Democrat who worked his
way up the legislative ladder. The speaker was a man who
cared more about helping friends and giving allegiance to the
party than being concerned about issues. His strongest allies
were members of veteran and labor groups and constituents from
his hometown.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate President con-
sidered the economy a high priority issue in 1978. Both were
concerned about the apparent lack of growth in the state's
economy. But the reasons differed. The Senate President, a
friend of business leaders and lobbyists, worried about the
plight of business in the state. The Speaker, on the other
hand, felt that too many of the people in his district were
without jobs or needed public services.
Because of his seniority, however, the Senate President
was the more powerful of the two leaders. In addition, he was
the only one who had a definite perspective on the economy.
That perspective had changed. Kevin Harrington, the Senate
President, and traditional Democrat, was greatly affected by
the recession in the early 1970's and the resultant shortfall
in state revenues. By 1974, during the worst point of the
state's recession, he decided that state policies were hurting
business. As a result, he changed his position on a number of
social issues:
In 1974, I began to realize what was happening
to the state. I began to realize we were
turning the Commonwealth into a sophisticated
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Appalachia. I would really blame all of us
collectively [in the legislature and the governor].
Since the post-world war, we did not realize
the fact that bad guys were right--we were
hurting business. I did not start to wake up
until 1973-74. Then I started to take some
unpopular positions.
The Senate President had a fatalistic attitude about the
state's economy--he thought that the state was heading into a
period of economic decline from which it might never recover.
He viewed his major failing as Senate President was not being
able to convince his colleagues to follow his economic policy
recommendations.
What did the Senate President advocate? The legislative
leadership, especially the Senate President, was more willing
than rank-in-file legislators to take politically unpopular
positions about economic policy. The Senate President, for
example, believed that the best economic policy was one that
lowered business and personal taxes by reducing state spending
on social programs.
However, try as he might, the Senate President could
never persuade his colleagues, who were fearful of electorate
reaction toward reduced services, to support a "limited
budget." Proposals to cut the budget ended up as bitter
disputes, with the Governor and the Senate President saying
the situation was caused by a type of generation gap:
Most of the politicians were born after the
Depression. They do not understand what
a real economic crisis is. Even with the
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crisis of 1974, they were unwilling to turn
their backs on social programs to save the
Commonwealth because that is where their
votes are.
The Rank-and-File Respond
What did his colleagues consider good economic policy?
Interviewees were asked that question in 1978 and 1980. In
each period the most popular programs were those that gave
financial incentives to industry to locate and expand in the
Commonwealth. Legislators from both parties preferred busi-
ness tax incentives--tax reductions or credits given to busi-
nesses for accomplishing a particular purpose. Democrats,
however, thought that revitalizing the older cities was the
next best economic program, while Republicans listed an across-
the-board reduction in business tax rates as second choice.
More legislators in 1980 than 1978 supported worker-training
programs. This was in response to the increased shortage of
skilled workers in the growing high technology industry.
Several legislators commented that they supported busi-
ness legislation as long as it was not "at the expense of the
people." Since most legislators supported tax incentives,
which reduced state revenues, and forced a reduction of
constituent services or an increase in other taxes, the phrase
obviously had a special meaning. To legislators, acceptable
business policy was actions that were non-controversial, un-
likely to anger voters. In other words, the policy had
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to be politically acceptable to voters.
To ensure this result, legislators relied on insiders who
worked within the legislature for advice--especially
colleagues on relevant committees and committee staff.
Insiders were accessible and knowledgeable about the range of
legislative possibilities. Even more important, insiders were
sensitive to the legislative process and the necessity to con-
sider the political impact that legislation could have in the
district. As one legislator explained:
The most valuable sources were colleagues on
relevant committees because they put it into
your terms . . . this is what this does and
this will be good for you for these reasons
and it will be bad because the people in your
district won't like it.
But legislators, including the legislative leadership, were
less concerned with the substance of the legislation than that
some economic, pro-business legislation get passed. Unless a
bill reduced tax rates, cut social spending or devoted
substantial resources to a controversial public works project,
the proposals received their most careful readings in the
legislative committees. Once given committee approval, the
legislature usually passed the legislation without discussion
or revision.
In the end, legislators were guided by two principles:
that, first, any economic program they supported to improve
the economy be non-controversial and second, welcomed by the
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business community. Since economic programs were designed to
improve the business climate, an attitude about the economy
that was difficult to measure, legislators were dubious about
research that evaluated the benefits of pro-business policies.
When asked in 1978 whether they would support policies if
research could prove no tangible economic benefits, many
legislators said that research could prove anything it wanted.
Some said that they would still support such policies if busi-
ness perceived there were benefits to the programs.
Conclusion
Legislators depended upon two conditions to exist:
prosperity and voter support. Voters re-elected them to
office. Prosperity provided the jobs and state revenues to
keep constituents happy. As legislators were well aware,
however, there was a contradiction in the system. Assisting
prosperity meant supporting the demands of the business com-
munity which were often in conflict with the constituent
demands. To accomplish both goals, legislators found a method
of improving the business climate--tax incentives--which
assist the business community without alienating voters.
Legislative leaders preferred more controversial policies,
such as limiting social programs, but have reluctantly
accepted the judgment of their colleagues as political
reality. Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure
both the condition of the business climate and government's
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ability to improve it. As a result, legislators put little
faith in research that attempted to evaluate the effectiveness
of a 'little' state's economic policy.
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APPENDIX I
Interviews with Massachusetts' elected officials undertaken
during the fall of the year 1980.
Form of Interviews
Nineteen interviews were conducted with elected officials
in his or her office as the legislature. The interviews took
between thirty to forty-five minutes. The questions were
pre-designed. Names of the legislators who participated are
in Appendix VI.
The Characteristics of the Sample
The sample was different from the general population of
the legislature in several ways. First, the sample included
more Republicans than the population as a whole. Thirty-seven
percent of the sample were Republicans and sixty-three percent
of the sample were Democrats, compared to a population split
of eighteen and eighty-one percent, respectively.
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Party Affiliation of Massachusetts Legislature 1978-80
(in percentage)
POPULATION SAMPLE
House of
Represen- Senate Total
tatives
House of
Represen- Senate Total
tatives
Republican
Democrat
19
81
15 19
85 82
037
63
37
63100
The political attitudes of the sample were also compared to the
population. The comparison was based on ratings given to the
legislature by the Beacon Hill Update, a bimonthly, newsletter that
reviews the efforts of state politicians. The ratings were based on
the votes of ten bills that reflected a legislator's attitude toward
the poor. A comparison revealed that the sample contained more con-
servative and liberal legislators than the population.
Beacon Hill Update Rating
(in percentages)
POPULATION SAMPLE
House of
Represen- Senate Total
tatives
House of
Represen- Senate
tatives
Less than 3 0 a
30-50
51-70
More than 70
43
40
8
9
18 38
33 38
15 12
34 12
aindicates percentage of times voted 'correctly' according to
Hill Update.
33
67
Total
44
31
6
19
37
26
11
26
Beacon
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Factors Considered In Voting
Legislators evaluated the importance of four factors--
personal ideology or values, the needs of the Commonwealth,
the views of party leadership and the needs and/or preferences
of constituents. The question was asked in two different
ways. First, legislators were asked to rank the importance of
the variables. The needs of the Commonwealth was the most
important variable7 party leadership was the least important.
Factors Considered in Voting
on Major Social and Economic Legislation
(in percentages)
Very Somewhat Not No
Important Important Important Response
Personal ideology 68 21 11 --
or values
The needs of the
Commonwealth
The views of party
leadership
The needs and/or
preferences of
your constituents
590
11
74
63
5
21 5
26
But the responses differed when legislators were asked to
give the most important factor. In this case, three-quarters
of the sample cited as most important the needs of
constituents, either alone or in combination with personal
ideology or values.
-57-
The Most Important Factor Considered
in Voting on Major Social and Economic Legislation
(in percentages)
Personal ideology 10
The needs of the Commonwealth --
The views of party leadership 5
The needs and/or preferences
of your constituents 53
Combination of personal
ideology or values and
the needs and/or pre-
ferences of your con-
stituents 21
No response 11
Trade Associations
Legislators understood the distinctions between trade
associations. Most, for example, knew that the Associated
Industries of Massachusetts and the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce represented older manufacturing firms and the
Massachusetts High Technology Council represented high-growth
industry.
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Which of the following four business groups--the
Massachusetts High Technology Council (MHTC), Associated
Industries of Massachusetts (AIM), the Greater Boston Chamber
of Commerce (Cham.) and the Massachusetts Taxpayer's
Foundation (MtF) represents the following types of firms?l
AIM MHTC CHAM. MTF NO
RESP.
Older manufacturing firms 68 -- 22 5 5
High growth industries -- 85 5 5 5
Banks and financial institu- 20 -- 25 50 5
tions
1Legislators were permitted to name more than one asso-
ciation for each category. Thus, the percentage is in rela-
tion to the total number of times associations were cited in
each category.
Legislators, however, did not depend upon trade asso-
ciations for financial assistance. For example, when asked
which trade association(or membership of a trade association)
gave the greatest financial assistance at campaign times,
fourteen legislators said that none did. Three gave the
Associated Industries of Massachusetts and two said insurance
companies provided financial assistance.
Legislators were also asked to the name the trade asso-
ciation that gave them the most technical assistance in their
jobs. The most common response was that none did or they gave
a name of an association that was not a trade association.
The Associated Industries of Massachusetts was the most fre-
quently cited trade association.
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Which trade association membership or lobbyists gives you the
most helpful technical assistance as background for deciding
policies, votes or legislation to introduce?
Number of
Responses
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation 4
Associated Industries of Massachusetts 6
Massachusetts High Technology Council 1
and Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation and
Associated Industries of Massachusetts 1
Other types of associations (labor,
teacher's group)l 5
None 2
1 MIT's Wednesday Morning Breakfast Group, an association
of liberals and community activists, was cited twice.
Finally, legislators were asked to name the one trade
association that carried the most influence. Once again, the
most frequent response was none or a group that was not a
trade association. Associated Industries of Massachusetts was
the most frequently cited association.
Number of
Responses
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation 1
Associated Industries of Massachusetts 4
Massachusetts High Technology Council 1
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation and 1
Associated Industries of Massachusetts,
Masschusetts High Technology Council and 1
Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Other types of associations (labor, etc.) 4
None 7
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APPENDIX II
Interviews with Massachusetts' officials undertaken during the
fall and winter of the years 1978 and 1979.
I. Elected Officials
Form of Interviews
Twenty interviews were conducted with elected officials
in his or her office at the state legislature. They took bet-
ween thirty minutes to an hour and a half, depending upon the
interest of the politician and the amount of interruptions.
The questions were pre-designed and, with one or two excep-
tions, followed the same format. The actual names of the
legislators interviewed are indicated in Appendix V.
The Characteristics of the Sample
The sample differs from the population of legislators in
several ways. First, the 1978-79 sample has proportionately
more Republicans than the population as a whole. Thirty-eight
percent of the sample were Republicans and sixty-two percent were
Democrats. In comparison, seventeen percent of the population
were Republicans and eighty-two percent were Democrats. Once
percent were Independents. The largest discrepancy was in the
State Senate. Fifty percent of the senators were Republicans
compared with a seventeen percent population norm.
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Republi
Democra
Indepen
PARTY AFFILIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE
1977 - 1978
(in percentages)
Population Sample
House of House of
Representatives Senate Total Representatives Senate Total
can 17 17 17 30 50 38
t 82 83 82 70 50 62
dent 1 1
The political attitudes of the sample was also compared
to the legislative population. To do this, the author exa-
mined the ratings given the two groups by the Americans for
Democratic Action, a liberal advocacy group. The Americans for
Democratic Action used 35 bills in the House and 23 bills in
the Senate to rank the legislators. The ratings established
that the sample was about twice as liberal as the population,
especially in the House of Representatives where the percen-
tage of the members sampled with ADA ratings over seventy was
over twice the percentage of the House membership.
House of House of
Representatives Senate Total Representatives Senate Total
less than 3 0 a 43 48 44 20 33 25
30 - 50 26 17 25 10 17 12
51 - 70 9 12 9 20 17 18
more than 70 22 23 22 50 33 25
aindicates percentage of times voted 'correctly' according to
the ADA.
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In order to get a better understanding of the
"liberalness" of the legislators interviewed, they were asked
to rank themselves about their attitudes toward fiscal and
social issues. Members of the House and Senate clearly viewed
themselves as more progressive/liberal or moderate on social
issues than fiscal issues. House members were more likely to
consider themselves conservative on social and fiscal issues
than Senators. This was especially true of fiscal matters;
33% of the Representatives compared with 14% of the Senators
called themselves fiscal conservatives.
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THEMSELVES
(In Percentages)
Social Issues Fiscal Issues
House of House of
Reps. Senate Total Reps. Senate Total
Progressive/Liberal 46 52 45 15 14 15
Moderate 46 58 50 54 72 60
Conservative 8 -- 5 31 14 25
The Business Climate
Fifteen legislators answered the questions on the state's
business climate. Of the 15 who responded, only six said that
the climate in 1978-79 was poor. The remaining nine thought
that the climate was fair or good, better than in the early
seventies, but with room for improvement.
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ATTITUDE ABOUT BUSINESS CLIMATE
House House Senate Senate
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Total
Gooda 1 - 1 2
Fair 4 2 1 7
Poor 3 2 1 - 6
aFive legislators never responded to the question.
Legislators were asked to reveal the basis of their
conclusions about the business climate. The two most impor-
tant sources were the legislators own feelings or observations
about either the economy, business' attitudes or the number of
economic programs or the feelings, and observations of busi-
nesspeople who resided in their districts. Lobbyists,
legislative committee staff or colleagues and newspapers or
magazines were mentioned less frequently.
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BASIS OF CONCLUSIONS ABOUT BUSINESS CLIMATE
House House Senate Senate
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Total
Herself/ 3 1 1 2 7
Himself
Business 1 3 1 - 5
Consti-
tuents
Lobbyists - -1 -1
Newspapers, 3 1 - 4
Journals
Othera 1 1 - 2
aIncludes legislative staff and colleagues. One person
did not respond.
Economic Policies
The interviewee was twice asked to recommend state economic
policies that should be followed in Massachusetts. First she
or he was requested to suggest several legislative and/or
administrative programs to improve the state's economy. No
guidance or suggestions were made to them by the interviewer.
Later, however, they were given a list of predetermined poli-
cies and asked to rank them on the basis of their effec-
tiveness in increasing employment in the state.
Sixteen legislators answered this part of the
questionnaire. In general, the proposals made by the legisla-
tors were quite varied, ranging from giving money to community
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development corporations to off-shore oil drilling for a
better energy supply to better transportaiton to the Boston
suburbs to training high technology engineers to work for the
growing high technology industry.
Ten of the sixteen legislators, however, had some type of
tax reform on their list of desirable economic policies. The
reforms suggested included broadening the sales tax, repealing
a surtax on personal income and eliminating the capital gains
tax. Seven of the ten suggestions were some form of business
tax reductions or tax incentives.
The list of seven economic policies that they were asked
to rank in relation to their effectiveness have been advocated
by different people as proper economic development strategies.
They were not meant to be all-inclusive. Still, one legisla-
tor thought that the selection, which included better
highways, revitalizing older cities, relaxing environmental
regulations for industry, tax reductions and incentives for
business and better public transit, to be generally without
value, and with some exception, ranked most of the suggestions
as sevens, the worst category. Because his numbering would
have produced a bias in the system, his numbers were not used
in calculating the final index.
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ECONOMIC POLICY RANKINGS BY LEGISLATORSa
Dem. Dem.
Ranka Points Rank
Rep. Rep.
Points Rank
Better Highways
Reduced busi-
ness taxes
Revitalizing
Older Cities
Business Tax
Incentives
Expanding Tech-
nical & Promo-
tional Capabil-
ities of the
Dept. of C&D
Rapid Transit
Relaxing Envir-
onmental Regu-
lations for
Industry
92
54
58
32
70
91
67
7
2
3
1
5
6
4
57
38
26
19
38
59
46
6
3
2
35
16
32
1 13
4 32
7 32
5 21
al=best policy; 7=worst policy
bthree legislators did not finish the survey and were not
calculated; one return from a legislator who had ranked all
but 3 policies as sevens, "7" was discarded to maintain con-
sistency in this table.
cTie vote.
Dem. = Democratic
Rep. = Republican
Total
PointsbPolicy
7
2
5c
1
4c
3
CHAPTER III
MASSACHUSETTS' BUSINESS COMMUNITY
Introduction
Obviously, understanding business-government relations in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requires a knowledge of the
state's business community. In particular, there are two
features about the state's political and economic past that
provide a perspective about the characteristic of business
involvement in the 'little' state.
1) The emergence of competition between growth and
marginal firms.
It is possible, for example, to trace the emergence of
competition between growth and marginal firms in Massachusetts
to the nineteenth century. During this period, differences in
needs led to conflicting public demands. Because of the
importance to local investors of the outcome of these public
decisions, business leaders took an active role in nineteenth
century party politics and state elections. By the mid-
twentieth century, however, business participation had
changed; most businesses now joined trade associations that
lobbied politicians who had few ties with the business
community.
2) The existence of the law of comparative advantage.
The early concentration of textile, leather and leather
goods industries in Massachusetts eventually led to a loss of
comparative advantage, business disinvestment, and the begin-
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nings of a class of marginal industries. Eventually, a new
class of growth firms located in the state and competed with
the class of marginal industries for the right to influence
public policy.
Business Participation in Politics
If there is a lesson to be learned from history, it is
that the level of an individual's participation in politics
depends upon potential benefits to be gained from that
participation. People of means, for example, were most active
in the affairs of Massachusets state government during the
period when they were making their greatest profit there:
when trade between Boston, England and the West Indies in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided local merchants
and shipowners with an excellent livelihood.
Since this was also a period of state's rights, being a
state politician gave the wealthy an almost unlimited ability
to propose public programs that furthered their material
advancement. In one way or another, they controlled state
affairs. For example, they organized the state legislature's
sessions so that representatives from the districts around the
Commonwealth moved to Boston several times a year for extended
periods to consider the affairs of state. Since represen-
tatives received no pay for attending to this civic duty, only
owners of businesses or those who did not have to work could
afford to serve the "public interest."
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But people of wealth did not always agree about
legislation. In particular, members of the nineteenth century
Massachusetts legislature represented two types of business
interests--the more traditional landed gentry from rural
districts who made their living from the land and people of
commerce who made their living from the sea. Both groups
wanted public policies that furthered their own material
advancement.1 Thus, the landed gentry really represented a
no-growth industry and they acted to preserve the monopoly
they always had on the local agricultural food market in the
state and voted against any public investment in building
transportation systems to other parts of the country that
would bring in outside produce. The people of commerce, on
the other hand, wanted to start to build public roads linking
Massachusetts with other regions to increase their trade.
One proposal they did not agree upon was the use of state
funds to construct a railroad. Not surprisingly, the landed
gentry and Democrats, people opposed to the use of state funds
to subsidize private ventures, opposed the public construction
of railroads that would connect newly developing industrial
towns with consumer markets. But such a railroad was too risky
lSee Edward Chase Kirkland, Men, Cities and
Transportation: A Study in New England History (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1948); Arthur Johnson and Barry
Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967); Stephen Salisbury, The State,
The Investor, and the Railroad: 1825-1967 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967).
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for private investors and for several years, a stalemate
existed between industrialists who did not have and wanted
railroads, and those against their construction.
The industrialists strategy to accomplish their goal was to
get even more involved in the political process. In this
situation, prominent industrialists joined with people of
commerce and organized the Whig Party. The new party ran
state-wide candidates for office. By the 1850's, the Whig
Party was the most powerful party in the legislature.
Although members of the new party included shopkeepers, far-
mers and even some factory workers, it was clearly controlled
by the affluent merchant and capitalist class; over 90 percent
of the City of Boston's wealthiest citizens during this period
were Whigs. 2
The industrialist strategy of becoming more involved in
the political process led to a new state policy to help
finance the railroad network. Four railroads--the Eastern,
the Nashua and Lowell, the Boston and Portland and the Norwich
and the Worcester--were subsequently lent over one million
dollars by the Commonwealth. A fifth railroad, the Western,
was almost completely constructed with state funds; the
Commonwealth loaned the railroad over three million dollars
2 Robert Rich, Politics and Pedigrees, The Wealthy Men of
Boston: 1798-1852 (Los Angeles: University of California,
1975)) 162.
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and purchased four hundred thousand dollars of its stock.
3
First Economic Disengagement
Two unrelated events, however, set the stage for business
disengagement from active participation in the political
process. First was an embargo, caused by the events of the
War of 1812, which halted trade between Europe and the United
States. Second, the state of New York completed the Erie
Canal in 1825. Although costing the enormous figure of $7
million, the canal brought trade to New York and made New
York, not Boston, the busiest trade center in the East.
No longer able to depend upon the Boston port for their
wealth, several local industrialists began to participate in
other ventures, especially industry. Several textile com-
panies were started in towns near Boston. From 1813, when the
first cotton textile company, the Boston Manufacturing
Company, was started on the banks of the Charles River, to the
beginning of the twentieth century, the state continued its
prosperous ways; it now became the leading manufacturing
state. For a time, cities like Fall River, in the southern
part of the state, with its cotton manufacturers and
Lawrence, with its boots and shoes, were nationally known cen-
ters of commerce. But as far back as the mid-nineteenth
3Sandra Kanter, "State Aid to the Western Railroad,"
(unpublished paper, 1978).
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century, the state's industrial supremacy began to be
challenged. At first, other industsrial states in the
Northeast, like New York and Pennsylvania, surpassed
Massachusetts in industrial output.
But by the early 1900's, there were signs that the South
would become a more important industrial region than the
Northeast. At least part of the reason had to do with com-
parative advantage. The South's production costs were simply
lower than the North's. Power to run the mills, raw materials
and labor were all cheaper. In 1919, for example, the average
hourly wage paid South Carolina production workers was 22
cents compared with 40 cents an hour for Massachusetts
workers.4
To the great discomfort of the industrialists, the period
between the late nineteenth century and the early part of the
twentiety century was a time of growing labor militancy in
Massachusetts. The most serious local strike erupted in
Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 when thousands of foreign-born
laborers took to the streets to battle giant textile owners
over the conditions of their employment. Although the
Lawrence strike was the largest, there were many others.
Between 1887 to 1929, labor engaged in over 7,200 strikes in
4 John Hammond, "Twentieth Century Manufacturers," in
Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, ed. Albert Hart, Vol. 5
(New York: The States History Company, 1930) 376.
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Massachusetts, an average of almost 175 a year. 5
For whatever reasons--disenchantment over growing labor
demands, a wish to expand in regions with cheaper resources,
or simply a lack of--mill owners in the North grew reluctant
to innovate in new technologies. The up-to-date textile mills
in the South took on the added advantage of increased
efficiency. The use of electricity to run textile-mill
machinery, for example, was more easily adopted in the South
than New England:
Textile mills were first established in South
Carolina in 1893 increasing steadily in that
state and in North Carolina, George and Alabama,
throughout the 'nineties. These mills put in
electric motors from the beginning. Indeed,
they were pioneers in adopting the electric
drive. New England mills, more conservative,
were nearly all electrically lighted, but for
a long time they could not bring themselves to
believe that electricity was competent to operate
machines--or that it could do so economically.6
By the twentieth century, it was not "business as usual."
Owners of the local mills and shoe companies began to invest
their money in establishments located in other parts of the
country. Thousands of Massachusetts' firms either went out of
existence or cut down production. Between 1923 and 1933, one
hundred fifty thousand manufacturing jobs had disappeared.
bSee George Coleman, "Labor and the Labor Movement," in
Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, ed. Albert Hart, Vol.V
New York: The States History Company, 1930) 429-452.
6John Hammond, "Twentieth Century Manufacturers," in
Commonwealth History of Massachusetts, ed. Albert Hart, Vol. V
New York: The States History Company, 1930) 376.
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The Massachusetts mills that remained were seriously
undercapitalized. In 1947, investment per employee in the
South was $320.50; investment per employee in Massachusetts
was $256.70.7 But businesspeople were not the only ones
losing confidence in the Massachusetts manufacturing
community. As far back as 1950, there were business
complaints about the reluctance of Boston banks to lend to
local industries. For example, in hearings before the U. S.
Senate's Committee on Banking and Currency, the U. S. Senator
from Illinois criticized the unwillingness of Boston banks to
lend to a particularly prospering industrial corporation:
I would like to know just what has happened
to the business judgment of the Boston
bankers, that they will refuse a loan so
that the business has to come running down
here to Washington to get government money
. . . here is a business which is earning
$1,500,000 a year on the average for the
last six years and whose present orders
on hand aggregate $40,000,000 when an invest-
ment of $1,000,000 will free it from a
rental charge of $224,000 and still the
Boston banks will not lend. 8
7Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report of the Special
Commission Relative to the Textile Industry (Boston, 1948) p. 39.
8 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency,
Study of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 81st Congress, 2d
Session, June - July, 1950, p. 293.
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Then Political Disengagement
The disengagement of capital started in the mills but
soon spread to the political world. With less of their for-
tunes tied to the local economy, industrialists lost interest
in controlling the state's public sector. Part of their
attention turned to the federal government after the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Federal Trade
Commission of 1914 had shifted the nexus of power from the
states to the federal government. In addition, there was more
to be gained from political involvement in other, less
developed, states. Consequently, industrialists stopped
running for public office in Massachusetts. Except for a
small group of people of wealth who thought it their civic
duty to serve in public offices, businesspeople soon limited
their formal public involvement to serving on advisory com-
missions to the governor or legislature.
The Massachusetts Business Community
Because the current business community was less directly
involved in the affairs of the 'little' state, its views were
not widely known. When members of the business community did
get involved, it appeared that they acted in unison--to offset
the powers of other interest groups like labor unions or
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environmentalists or to advance policies in their own
interests. Even critics of capitalism, who devote con-
siderable efforts to the study of private enterprise, often
To understand the actions of the modern day business
community, we need first to define what we mean by "business
community." There are several ways to answer this question.
One approach is to draw a statistical sketch of business firms
in the state.
In 1975, manufacturing companies, for example, were still
the most important employers in the state. But just barely:
service-sector companies and wholesale and retail firms
employed almost as many people. Altogether, the three sectors
contributed seven out of ten jobs in the state. 9 Finance,
insurance, and real estate firms, on the other hand, accounted
for less than one job in ten.
The statistics on the Massachusetts private sector pro-
vide part of the explanation for the influence of different
elements of the business community. For instance, within the
manufacturing sector, the fastest growing part of the manufac-
turing sector were firms that made durable products, espe-
cially high technology machinery. High technology was important
9 Craig Moore and Steven Rosenthal, Massachusetts
Reconsidered: An Economic Anatomy of the Commonwealth
(Amherst: School of Business Administration, 1975) pp. 17-18.
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in another way. Ten percent of the state's largest firms
accounted for ninety percent of the corporate tax revenues.10
Many of the biggest contributors were high technology firms.
A number of small firms were new firms, just getting started.
Others could be classified as marginal--long time
establishments with little expectation of growth. Still,
small firms served a purpose in this state. Over ninety per-
cent of the establishments in Massachusetts employed fifty or
fewer workers. More important, one out of every three jobs in
the state was in firms that employed fewer than fifty
workers.
A third group of firms--banks, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions--were relatively insignificant
employers of workers and contributors of state revenues. Yet,
their importance lay in another direction- -the state' s finan-
cial community was the nation's most important source of pri-
vate capital. It was also a major market for public bonds and
notes.
Another way to define the business community is to talk
about the owners or presidents of companies who are able to
influence public policy. Who were the business leaders in
1 0 Statement of Daniel Breen, Director of Research,
Department of Revenues, Fall, 1979.
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Massachusetts? There were three types--the Technocrat, the
Brahmin and the Family Person. Technocrats were
well-educated, born in other parts of the country, who often
moved here to attend one of the Massachusetts well-known
institutions of higher learning and stayed or were recruited
from elsewhere to become chief executives of large business
establishments. Technocrats resided in the Concords and
Lincolns, wealthy Boston suburbs, and were only "involved" in
state politics if there was an issue that affected their
company. Once involved, technocrats supported efforts to
reduce public spending and government's interference in the
marketplace. They believed others could do what they had
done--achieve their jobs through hard work and use of native
intelligence.
Brahmins had different characteristics. Born and bred in
Massachusetts, their families made their money from shipping,
commerce, and early manufacturing in the state. A small group
of Brahmins had a tradition of service to the state and in the
seventies, still served in official capacities. Those who
worked were frequently involved in finance. They ran the
major banks in the state. While fiscal conservatives,
Brahmins were likely to display a feeling of social obligation
to the state's very poor and needy. Although they enjoyed
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having influence in the public sector, Brahmins abhored publi-
city and media attention.
The third type of business leader was the "Family Person"-
-the owner of the small business. Many family persons ran
second-or third-generation manufacturing establishments
started by their father or grandfather. Displaying a wide
variety of ideologies, they came from different ethnic and
religious backgrounds and lived in any number of towns areound
the state. Although they had little time to get actively
involved in state politics, they displayed an intense interest
in events at the state house. To compensate for their time
limitations, family persons depended upon their lobbyists to
act on their behalf at the state house.
Collective Action
Even for business leaders, political access was always
unequal. Consequently, business leaders who wanted political
access often joined associations that could protect their
sector's interest at the state house.
The most powerful business associations in Massachusetts
were trade associations--groups formed around particular
interests. The oldest of the state's trade associations in
Massachusetts was the Boston Chamber of Commerce (Chamber).
Chartered by the Massachusetts Legislature in 1909, the mem-
bership of the Chamber--a mixture of manufacturers, bank
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executives, professionals and retail store owners--reflected
the composition of the city's economy at the turn of the
century. The first officers of the Chamber included the
owners of a mill and produce company and a bank executive.
Like the city it represented, the Chamber has changed in
composition over time. Its membership has been increasingly
from the Boston-based supporting sector of the economy. In
1952, the Chamber renamed itself the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce in an effort to attract members from surrounding
cities. But the Chamber remained an organization of Boston
banks, insurance companies, real estate firms and retail
stores.
The Chamber has always had two objectives: the protec-
tion and enhancement of business interests in the state and the
promotion of the city of Boston as an economic community. To
attain these goals, the 1,300 member organization has been
involved in the legislative and regulatory process of state
government, especially in the areas of transportation and the
environment.
The Chamber has not been a particularly effective
lobbying association. One reason might be that many of its
members, especially banks and insurance companies that were
part of the growing sector of the economy, did not need to be
in an association to have influence. But a former head of
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the Chamber had another explanation. He blamed the Chamber's
limited effectiveness on organizational difficulties--the ina-
bility of the Republican-based organization to work with a
largely Democratic legislature. In contrast, he claimed that
the Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM) was the most
effective lobbying group in the state:
Today it lost its clout; what the hell can a
Chamber of Commerce do when you've got a
Democratic House and Senate? In the old
days, when it was fairly evenly divided, you
could make deals and sort of try to balance
things out. The most effective lobbying
organization now is the Associated Industries
of Massachusetts.11
Who did AIM represent? The Associated Industries of
Massachusetts was started in 1915 as a lobbying association
for paper companies located in the central and western parts
of the state. In the beginning, the association members were
owners of small family businesses. By 1978, the majority of
its 2,600 members were still officers of small manufacturing
companies who benefited from the lobbying and service programs
of the association* Only one-third of the members repre-
sented high technology companies.
Like other trade associations, AIM supported programs
l1 Rick Smith, "An Uninhibited Eph Catlin Speaks Out," The
Real Paper, February, 1976, p. 2.
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that benefited its constituency. In particular, AIM favored
policies that helped small, home-based manufacturing--marginal
firms--with little expectation of future growth. This has
translated into lobbying for policies that reduce the cost of
doing business in the state.
Recently, however, AIM has worked with another newer
association, representing the fast growing technology industry
in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts High Technology Council
(MHTC), only three years old, has just ninety members; one-
half of the members, however, have started their businesses
within the last seven years. Although small in number, its
1978 membership represented ten percent of the state's total
employment.
Because high-technology firms were companies growing
at a rapid rate, the Massachusetts High Technology Council
favored economic policies that helped its members to expand. 1 2
12 Since MHTC officials refused to talk to this researcher
and AIM does not make public its membership, it is con-
sequently impossible to verify this general economic descrip-
tion of MHTC and AIM provided by several officials of AIM. We
did compare employment and establishment trends for firms
represented on the board of the Massachusetts High Technology
Council with general manufacturing trends in the state.
Assuming AIM membership represents a cross-section of industry
in the state, the analysis reveals that MHTC firms are likely
to be above average in employment size and employment growth.
See Appendix III.
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Since their chief difficulty was a scarcity of skilled
labor, the Council supported programs to attract or train
qualified technicians. Such programs included job training,
reduced personal income taxes (to attract skilled employees
from other states) and a public school system that graduated
people able to enter the technology field. In addition, the
technocrats who ran the high technology companies were ideolo-
gically opposed to the state's array of social programs. They
wanted state spending on social program to be cut, not only as
a way of reducing taxes, but also because they believed in
limiting government expenditures to capital-producing
ventures. Finally, the High Technology Council, whose member
firms were largely located in suburban communities, opposed
public policies that favored cities.13
Firms join trade associations for two reasons--power and
13One newspaper writer observed:
At fundamental levels of fiscal policymaking, the
goals of the suburban-based high-tech industry are in conflict
with those of the urban commerce and finance industries. Take
the issue of property tax relief, it's not on the high-tech
council's shopping list because its member firms are typically
small and located in communities with low tax rates. More
specifically, take local aid, the method of reducing property
taxes; the council opposed last year's innovative formula for
distributing local aid because a disproportionate share of
state aid was routed to cities at the expense of the suburbs.
(Michael Segal, "High Tech", The Boston Phoenix, 18 September,
1979, p. 48).
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a commonality of views.1 4 There was, of course, power in
joining together and acting collectively to influence public
policy. A president of a high-technology firm explained:
Businesses have to act collectively. If left to
their own devices, business people will forget
about issues and not do anything. By acting collect-
ively, they present a stronger constituency, rep-
resenting a whole group.
Often, size determined the involvement of a company in
the activities of a trade association. The larger the
company, the more its resources, the less its need for collec-
tive support and the more it was able to influence policy on
its own. An official of another high technology firm
described why his firm joined MHTC:
If companies are big enough then
leaders can act on their own and
have influence. for firms with
$100-200 million or less . . .
getting together is far more
influential than acting independently.
[name of company] being very small,
would have no voice without the
Massachusetts High Technology Council.
We don't have the resources or the
staff to act independently.
14Interviews with officials of three Massachusetts-based
companies were conducted. The companies represented in the
interviews included Alpha Industries, Monsanto Company and
Adar Associates. Two officials were board members of the
Massachusetts High Technology Council. One was active in
Associated Industries of Massachusetts. In addition, inter-
views were held with five officials of the Associated
Industries of Massachusetts, and officials from the Mass.
Taxpayers Foundation and the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce. The staff of the Massachusetts High Technology
Council did not respond to repeated requests for interviews.
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For smaller firms, there was no replacement for mem-
bership in a trade association: for example, the general
manager of a chemical company located in Massachusetts cited
the advantages of being a member of AIM:
We are a member of AIM because, overall,
it helps us make the best use of limited
resources. For education, we can take
advantage of their expertise, their collec-
tive knowledge and their experience. AIM
is a channel through which to make our
opinions known to communicate with people
outside of industry. AIM has the time,
resources and expertise to look at bills
coming out of the legislature and to deter-
mine their importance. From this, they
publish lists of bills for us to look at.
Some firms preferred joining associations that they could
influence. Others preferred limiting their memberships to
trade associations that had similar objectives. In 1980, for
instance, an official of at least one Massachusetts high-tech-
nology company was considering the possibility of dropping its
AIM membership in favor of the High Technology Council, which
had goals more in keeping with their own. Another never
bothered to join.
[name of company] is a member of the High
Technology Council because it represents
the only association of high technology
companies that have common problems and acts
as a pressure on state issues. At present,
we are a member of AIM but may disenroll
because of their position on Proposition 21 .
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[name of company] is not a member of AIM
because we have a limited budget and a
limited amount of time. The firm is a member
of MHTC because I personally agree with its
goals and purposes.
Legislators' Attitude Toward Business Associations
State legislators understood the distinction between
association memberships. For instance, the vast majority of
legislators interviewed in 1980 said that AIM represented most
of the older manufacturing firms. At the same time, they knew
that High Technology Council members were high technology
growth firms and that the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce,
along with the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, a tax
research and lobbying group, represented banks and financial
institutions.15
How did trade associations acquire influence at the state
legislature? There were three ways to influence the political
process--by being critical to the state's economic well-being,
by providing assistance to legislators in their jobs, and by
helping legislators at election time.
(1) Technical Assistance and Friendships
Above all, legislators valued the technical assistance
given to them in their job by business lobbyists. There was,
in fact, a relationship between influence and assistance. Of
15 See Appendix II.
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the fifteen legislators responding in 1978, eleven named AIM
as the most important lobbying group operating in the state
legislature. With one exception, the same legislators also
said that AIM's lobbyists knowledge of subjects made them
powerful. The fact that AIM's lobbyists had been around a
long time and understood the pressures of a legislator's job
was also important to a number of legislators.
Two years later, the response was different. At that
time, six of the nineteen legislators interviewed considered
AIM to be the most influential trade association. But the
variance was not as great as it might seem. In 1978, legisla-
tors were given a pre-selected group of six organizations
active in economic policy and asked to select the most
influential group. The 1980 interview was less restrictive;
legislators were simply asked to name the most influential
business lobbying group. Even so, AIM was the most frequently
cited organization. The only answer given more frequently was
that there was not a single influential lobbying group.
Further, over one-half the legislators who responded to the
1980 question said that AIM provided them with the most tech-
nical assistance.
What did legislators mean by technical assistance? They
valued the ability of AIM's lobbyists to analyze legislative
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proposals, both in terms of their economic and political
impact, and to suggest compromises that would satisfy dif-
fering interests. At one time, AIM's lobbyists were almost
indispensable. Until the early seventies, for example,
legislators had virtually no staff to research issues and eva-
luate the feasibility of bills. AIM's lobbyists often served
that function. Sometimes they were even qiven an administra-
tive role in the legislature. In the Commerce and Labor
Committee, for example, AIM's lobbyists decided when the com-
mittee would hold hearings on bills.
Yet, AIM's influence did not come cheaply. Records kept
by the Massachusetts Secretary of State indicate that AIM
devoted considerable resources to their legislative duties,
not only in providing technical assistance to legislators but
in socializing with them. In an eighteen-month period, be-
tween January 1979 to June, 1980, wages and expenses of AIM's
lobbyists at the legislature totaled $122,000 versus $25,500
for Massachusetts High Technology Council lobbyists. A
significant proportion of the money went to reimburse lob-
byists for meals and transportation. For instance, one AIM
lobbyist recorded over $1,500 spent on meals and transpor-
tation in a six-month period.16
The technical assistance given by AIM's lobbyists was
important for a third reason--AIM represented firms that
16 See Appendix III.
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employed over 487,000 employees, 20 percent of the work-force.
While many of these firms were not expected to grow in the
years to come, they still represented a significant and
necessary segment of the voting community. In addition,
as an old association, AIM officials had been active lobbyists
at the state house for over a century. Some of their lob-
byists were former legislators, lawyers or businesspeople
whose only job was persuading state officials to act in their
memberships' interest. For the most part, lobbyists held
their positions for a long period, building up, over time,
relationships with state officials. They became valuable
friends who could give political advice to new legislators,
treat old legislators to lunch and introduce sympathetic
legislators to businesspeople located in their districts. In
essence, AIM took on the form of a constituency, representing
a sizeable segment of the business community who demanded
public policies in their interest. In return, they offered
services, like technical assistance, political advice, and free
lunches, that made a legislator's life a little easier.
(2) Helping at Election Time
Business leaders were aware that state officials, espe-
cially legislators, placed the highest priority on getting
reelected. In order to maximize their own influence, busi-
nesspeople naturally became involved in party politics.
Business leaders were once active Republican party members.
But after the decline in the state's economy, they reduced
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their partisanship role and until the nineteen fifties, the
business community maintained a close but less formal rela-
tionship with the Republican Party. Since they depended upon
the party to support programs that would benefit them, busi-
ness people provided financial contributions to the campaigns
of Republican office-seekers.
The break came in 1958. By then a minority party, the
Republicans had influence only in the State Senate, where it
controlled fifty percent of the seats. Business leaders,
especially AIM's lobbyists, expected that the Senate
Republicans could block legislation that was not in their
interest. Yet, just the opposite happened. To their chagrin,
they found some Republicans joining their Democratic
colleagues to vote for bills raising business taxes and to
vote against pro-business bills limiting workers' rights.
Faced with depending upon the undependable actions of an
ever increasing minority party, and the need for policies that
assisted them during a period of economic change, business
MIDEC gave a total of $500.00 and $700.000, respectively,
to the Senate Chairmen of the Taxation and Commerce and Labor
Committees, $400.00 to the Senate President and $100.00 to
the Chairperson of the Senate Ways and Means and the House
Natural Resource and Agriculture Committees. In comparison,
members of the High Technology Council gave amounts that never
exceeded $150.00 to any one candidate during the three-year
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period.1 7 Through the years, other businesses have also
contributed to political campaigns. For instance, a group of
business people with utility company backgrounds, called the
Committee to Elect Responsible Public Officials, gave out more
than $30,000 to 85 candidates to the 1978 state
legislature.18
But even more important than formal fund-raising
organizations, long-time business lobbyists could always be
counted on to buy tickets to legislator's testimonials and
fundraising events or to publish complementary articles about
cooperative legislators in trade journals sent to their
districts just before election time. Frequently, lobbyists
persuaded local businesspeople to buy tickets to similar elec-
tion functions.
(3) Ensuring prosperity
Growth firms have had access to state government because
of their importance to the future of the state's economy.
There are two types of growth firms. First are the set of
firms expected to expand and increase employment in the state.
An excellent example of this type of enterprise was the fast-
growing high technology companies. Since Massachusetts offi-
cials believed they needed high technology growth to ensure
1 7 See Appendix II.
1 8 Michael Segal, "High Tech," The Boston Phoenix, p. 48
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continued employment in the future, high technology officials
were often asked to serve on public commissions or to evaluate
legislation proposed by legislators and the governor. As
newcomers, unfamiliar with the legislative process and inef-
fectual lobbyists, however, they had more influence in the
governor's office than with state legislators.
In addition, some firms are growth firms because they
provide a service or infrastructure necessary for the expan-
sion of all other industry in the state. Because the state
was greatly dependent upon financial institutions for its eco-
nomic well-being, financial institutions were this type of
growth firms.
Banks were important for several reasons. Like other
states, the Commonwealth used tax-exempt bonds to finance
capital projects. Not only did banks and insurance companies
purchase a significant amount of these bonds, but acting as
the state's agent, banks also issued the bonds. In doing so,
banks determined the interest rate to be paid. When required,
they also purchased short-term state notes. But the financial
community's importance extended beyond the public sector.
Insurance companies and banks were also the chief source of
funds for land development projects and business loans--
prerequisites to a healthy, growing economy.
Unlike other businesspeople, officials of the financial
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community did not need to join groups to acquire influence.
Since their support was indispensable to a prosperous economy,
individual business leaders representing major banks and
insurance companies had immediate access to state officials.
The presidents of major Boston banks were valued advisers to
the governor. In addition, because the state most needed out-
side funds when its own revenues were down, the bankers' role
and influence in the public sector expanded during periods of
recession or economic uncertainty. At times, they appeared to
control large segments of public policy.
For example, in 1975, the state was recovering from a
major recession. State revenues were declining and there
was talk about a budget deficit, which could be as high as
one-half a billion dollars. A fiscal crisis was dangerously
near. One hundred and twenty million dollars in state bonds
were in danger of going in default. Nor surprisingly,
Governor Dukakis turned to the biggest bank, the First
National Bank, to buy a portion of these bonds.
The First National Bank had always taken a position that
the state government should reduce its spending and use the
savings to cut business taxes and the tax on capital gains. A
representative of the First National Bank agreed to help the
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governor if he in turn complied with some of its terms.19
Most specifically, he demanded that the governor support
increasing the sales tax from three to six percent and
broadening it to include clothing and that there be a major
state expenditure control program. The governor refused to
sponsor the tax measure but agreed to control state
expenditures.
Chester Atkins, a young, liberal state senator in 1975,
now Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means,
described the power exerted by the banks during this period.
In an editorial he wrote for the Boston Globe, the senator
said that multinational commercial banks had become another
tier of government, able to dictate the terms and conditions
of public policy in return for financing a part of it:
Now there appears to be an additional branch
of government, one that is anonymous, unelected
and unaccountable--the multi-national commercial
banks. We must now also ask if those financial
institutions will provide the government access
to funds, through the bond markets, to finance
the proposal.
State government and the financial community have
wrapped themselves up on a self-perpetuating
cycle, pursuing tired and imprudent strategies
for raising, and subsequently spending, public
capital. The situation is a comfortable one;
19Account reconstructed through interview with Harriet
Taggart, Director of Housing, Metropolitan Area Planning
Council, August, 1978.
-95-
the financial community is satisfied, able to
tell the state what to do and when to do it;
and responsibility for voting for taxes to
finance bond expenses on the grounds that banks
held a gun to the state's head.20
But banks were not the only industries critical to the
state's economy which took advantage of the 1975 fiscal
crisis. To increase state revenues during a period of high
unemployment in 1971, the governor and the state legislature
passed a one percent gross investment tax on domestic life
insurance companies. In 1975, over the objections of the life
insurance industry, members of Governor Dukakis' staff met
with executives of two major locally-based insurance companies
to discuss a proposal in which insurance companies would buy
state bonds in return for reducing their tax burden. Although
the proposal was never formalized, the insurance companies
bought state bonds. Three years later, the Democratic gover-
nor actively lobbied through the legislature a bill elimi-
nating the insurance tax.
Playing by the Rules
Business leaders agreed on broad goals--more freedom for
business to operate in the marketplace, lower business taxes,
reduced social programs--but they frequently disagreed both
about the specifics of various policies and the priorities
2 0 Chester Atkins, "Banks Gain Critical Power Over Sale of
State Bonds," Boston Globe, 9 January 1976, p. 23.
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placed upon them. Members of the business community,
including officials of the trade associations, were aware of
these differences that often manifested themselves in
disagreements between the associations. For instance, several
business leaders thought that the Associated Industries of
Massachusetts was more moderate in its views than the
Massachusetts High Technology Council:
Every business will not always agree on policies.
MHTC is a homogenous group that tends to agree.
Within AIM, there are older, varied industries
and you probably wouldn't find much agreement.
MHTC is not looking for a reduction of business
taxes. Rather we are concerned with taxes,
government structure and education as it affects
our ability to attract and keep good employees.
AIM membership is diverse. . . the problems of
these firms may be different and because of its
diversity, AIM won't take a firm position but
rather a watered down [one].
A few legislators understood the difference between the
trade associations. For instance, two state representatives
made the following comments about the demands made by AIM and
MHTC:
The lobbyists for AIM and the High Tech
Council sometimes have conflicting demands.
AIM is less radical in tax limitation pro-
posals. MHTC is unrealistic, technically
incompetent and. . . is going in a different
direction.
The High Tech Council is reaching to differ-
ent areas, new horizons. AIM has to take care
of established industries.
Yet only seven of the nineteen legislators interviewed in
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1980 observed the conflicting demands among trade
associations. The others either saw more similarities than dif-
ferences or had too little contact with business leaders to
express an opinion.
Why were legislators less aware of the differences than
members of the business community? Generally, business
leaders believed that their common interests required that
differences between them be private, out of the view of the
media or legislature. One business official said that there
was no overriding reason to keep differences quiet, but ".
if there's nothing to be gained, why bother?" Another
believed that businesses did not like to air differences
publicly because they ". . . are loathe to be controversial
and go against the main stream." An official of a trade asso-
ciation said that the interrelationship between businesses and
business groups was already complex and to disagree publicly
would make it harder to work together.
As a result, trade associations and business leaders who
lobbied the state legislature developed an informal code of
behavior that allowed them a facade of public unity while
advancing often separate objectives. The code had three
rules.
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Rule One: go where your self-interest is greatest 2'
This was the most important rule. Because trade asso-
ciations and major institutions must set limits on its
lobbying efforts, each concentrated on what it perceived as
its most important programs and policies. They became experts
in that area of public policy. Since AIM was concerned about
the cost of doing business, its lobbyists became
knowledgeable in tax law and labor legislation. The Chamber
of Commerce was most active in city programs--environmental
regulations and urban transportation. The High Technology
Council worked on job training issues. Utility companies were
key lobbyists on health issues. The Boston Bar Association, a
lawyers association, concentrated on inheritance and admi-
nistrative tax laws, two important areas of client concern.
Thus, business lobbyists had two roles; on issues they
were concerned about, they were either primary or secondary
advocates. Primary advocates were lobbyists who took the lead
in a particular aspect of public policy that was very impor-
tant to them. They were experts and the most active lobbyists
on that issue. Other business lobbyists generally respected
the territory of primary advocates. Unless the issue was
extraordinarily critical to more than one type of business,
they preferred not to take on the function as primary advocate
if another business group had already made that claim.
21 Most of the business people interviewed denied there were
rules of conduct guiding their behavior. However, their actions
often contradicted such denials. The rules that follow are based
on observations of the author who spent several years working at
the Massachusetts State Legislature.
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Instead, they become secondary advocates--interested in a par-
ticular issue, willing to be party to a compromise, but not
the leaders in any negotiations that took place. In essence,
the rule limited competition between the two segments of the
business community to the most important issues.
Rule Two: Cooperate only when major gains are to be made
or major issues to be avoided
Business leaders sometimes collaborated on major poli-
cies when it was mutually beneficial. In such situations,
AIM, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, or leaders of the
banking community would act as the leader in getting others to
work in the coalition. The groups in the coalitions depended
upon the issue. For instance, the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce brought leaders together to help them lobby for a
better airport and seaport. AIM worked with building contrac-
tors to minimize environmental regulations slowing down the
process of land development. Several Boston banks joined with
other businesses to appeal a law denying corporations the
right to finance public campaigns over laws. General Electric
lobbyists teamed up with AIM's lobbyists to limit the provi-
sions of a maternity-leave provision in the health insurance
law.
Rule Three: Always maximize the appearance of power
The final rule dealt with political survival. Business
leaders were uncomfortable when trade associations or busi-
nesses appeared to be increasing their power to influence. In
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such a situation weaker partners preferred collaborating with
the influential party rather than risk losing their own poli-
tical access. Specifically, the growing importance and
influence of the High Technology Council in Massachusetts
state government has led to new alliances. Fearful of
losing power on Beacon Hill, AIM and the Boston Chamber of
Commerce have recently linked up with high technology com-
panies and the MHTC on a number of projects. Some of the new
collective actions included:
The broad-based Boston Chamber of Commerce
has been grooming for its presidency the head
of a suburban (and high tech) company . . .
Associated Industrial of Massachusetts and the
Council have linked up to co-sponsor a tax-
cutting initiative petition for the 1980 ballot.
And the titans of the state's commerce, finance,
insurance and utility industries are banding
together for the first time to form a local
equivalent of the National Business Roundtable. 2 2
Conclusion
As described, the business community in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts is far from monolithic. Because of their
diversity and different needs, individual firms and trade
associations sought access to public officials in order to
advance their own particular interests. They had three ways
to influence. Growth firms were critical to the state's
economic future and often did not need to do anything else but
exist to gain influence.
2 2 Michael Segal, "High Tech," The Boston Phoenix, p. 48.
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But other firms joined groups like AIM and combined efforts to
first, provide technical assistance to public officials and
second, help re-elect politicians to office. Essentially,
such associations took on the characteristics of a public
official's constituency. Although being a growth firm was the
easiest way to gain influence, it did not always result in the
most power. As we have seen, legislators rewarded access to
associations that served them politially.
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APPENDIX III
Trade Association Expenses
Incurred While Working on
Legislative Matters--Massachusetts
State Government
January, 1979 - June, 19801
Associated
Industries of Mass. High
Massachachusetts Technology Council
Lobbyists' salaries
Lobbyists' reimbursement2
Other expenses
Total
$ 79,250
8,275
34,444
121,969
lFrom records kept at the Department of State Secretary,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
2 Includes transportation, meals, and other expenses
incurred by legislative agents in connection with their
lobbying duties.
$12,351
564
12,719
25,635
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Contributions to the Legislature
Leadership by Member of the
Boards of Directors and the
Lobbyists from Associated Industries
of Massachusetts and the
Massachusetts High Technology Council
(1979-1980)
Title
Speaker of the House
Source
AIM PACl
Massachusetts Industrial
Development and Economic
Council (MIDEC)
Contribution
Amount
$ 100.00
Chairman, House Ways
and Means
Chairman, House
Taxation Committee
Chairman, House Natural
Resource and Agri-
cultural Committee
Chairman, House Commerce
and Labor Committee
Senate President
Chairman, Senate
Ways and Means
Chairman, Senate
Natural Resource
and Agriculture
Committee
MHTC Lobbyist
AIM PAC (MIDEC)
AIM's Board of Director(member)
AIM PAC (MIDEC)
AIM lobbyist
AIM PAC (MIDEC)
MHTC's Board of Director
(member)
AIM PAC (MIDEC),
AIM's lobbyists
IPAC is Political Action Committee
none
100.00
100.00
none
100.00
400.00
50.00
100.00
350.00
700.00
60.00
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APPENDIX IV
Change in Employment Growth for High Technology Firms
Associated with Massachusetts High Technology Council
vs. Manufacturing as a Whole.
Massachusetts, 1972 - 19781
High Technology Employment Associated with the
Massachusetts High Technology Industry 2
SIC
represented
Employment, Employment,
1972 1978
Weighted
Change in
Employment,
1972-19783
Weighted
Percentage
Change in
Employment
for All
Firms,
1972-1978
15
26
28
30
33
34
35
36
38
73
89
26,494
32,392
15, 541
33,164
14, 848
40,871
71,928
82,807
33,298
52,131
24,771
56,7264
14, 716
30,424
16,368
31,836
14,479
49,542
86, 944
86,213
50,977
81,917
30,616
-117
-19
33
-39
-3
346
3604
987
5126
893
58
11,225 19%Total
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Manufacturing Employment
Percentage
Change in Change in
Employment, Employment, Employment, Employment,
1972 1978 1972-1978 1972-1978
All Manufac-
turing in
Massachusetts 62,994 650,841 28,847 5%
1The employment change for high technology firms were
weighted according to their representation on the Masschusetts
High Technology Council. For instance, if one percent of the
Council consisted of firms under SIC 15, then it was assumed
that SIC 15 firms on the Council accounted for one percent
of the change in total employment for that classification.
Statistics came from U.S. Department of Commerce, County
Business Patterns (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1973 and 1980).
2SIC classifications for the 80 firms on the Massachusetts
High Technology Council came from George D. Hall, Directory of
Massachusetts Manufacturers, 1980-81 (Boston, 1981).
3Employment adjusted for representation on the Massachusetts
High Technology Council.
4 Weighted using method described in Footnote 1.
CHAPTER IV
RESOLVING CONFLICTS
Introduction
One critical objective, accepted by state officials, dic-
tates the formation of policy in the 'little state'. That
objective is to institutionalize a system of government in
which interest groups are focussed on narrow concerns, rather
than broad issues. Legislative committees, for example, have
specialized areas of jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, legisla-
tive committees also extend the narrowness of their areas of
jurisdiction by subdividing subjects even more for the purpose
of holding hearings and voting on legislation. By doing this,
problems and conflicts become manageable in size and solutions
limited in consequence. In addition, legislators also avoid
bringing together diverse groups of unhappy constituents who
could demand reforms impossible to meet.
Decentralizing power is also an objective of most busi-
ness leaders. This is especially true of business leaders
with the resources to lobby legislators on a multitude of
issues. They believe that they have more power to influence
public policy if there is a lack of unity among the electorate
and decisions made in a decentralized fashion. As the head of
a trade association explains:
We believe that the pluralism of society
would protect us. I fear the consolidation
of power. If you have increasing power, how
do you control it?
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I. Business Tax Policy
Until recently, this narrowness of focus has been used
to great advantage by AIM's lobbyists to control the formation
of business tax policy. Their motivation was to reduce business
taxes, a cost of doing business most directly controlled by
state legislators. Business tax law can be very technical and
AIM's representatives have displayed a knowledge of the field
that often surpasses legislators and their staffs. By pro-
posing tax changes that were complicated and not easily
understood by the general public, AIM's lobbyists have mini-
mized potential conflicts between interest groups and been
given enormous control over the formation of new business
tax legislation.
The AIM Strategy
Obviously, one way to look at business taxes is within
the context of the general structure of tax burdens and state
needs. How much should business pay to run the state in rela-
tion to other groups in society? What was the optimal amount
of constituent service? Just as obviously, these were
questions that AIM's officials, intent on reducing their cost
of doing business, wished to avoid. Instead, AIM's argument
for reducing business taxes was that it would induce firm
expansion.
The combination of a Democratic legislature, with a
liberal spending philosophy, and a stagnant industrial base,
made taxes a focus of AIM's attention. Since the turn of the
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century, AIM has denounced what they called the "bad business
climate." The "bad business climate" was caused by social and
economic legislation, which at one time or another, included
minimum wages, protective labor laws for children, the gra-
duated income tax and high business taxes. 1
While taking public positions on a number of issues, AIM,
through its lobbyists, concentrated its efforts on a small
number of topics. As explained, they became technical experts
in the very technical field of business tax law. Through
their interest in the subject, AIM's lobbyists developed
working relationships with legislators on the tax committee.
Legislators began to think of AIM as businesses' representative
on business tax issues.
AIM's leaders were pragmatic; they knew the difficulty of
revising the tax laws. They had two principles by which they
chose their business tax strategy. Obviously, any change in
the business tax law must serve their interests. In addition,
changes must have some possibility of success. The principles
evolved from experience. AIM's officials have tried in the
past to convince public officials to lower business tax rate.
But state officials, faced with rising costs and expanded
social programs, have been reluctant to limit (and sometimes
lSee Robert L. Kann, "Social Legislation and
Massachusetts' Business Climate." (Boston Urban Planning Aid,
1976).
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have raised) the more important revenue producing property or
income taxes. As a result, they were reluctant to reduce
business tax rates when consumer taxes were constant or
increasing, a set of events that could anger the electorate.
AIM consequently settled upon a second-best strategy.
Rather than demanding a reduction in the tax rate, the organi-
zation opposed any increases in the rate (an important stra-
tegy when other taxes were increasing). Furthermore, they
asked the legislature to exempt manufacturers from any new
taxes. Thus, in 1966, when public officials were considering
a sales tax to increase state revenues, AIM's lobbyists suc-
cessfully persuaded the legislature to exclude business machi-
nery and materials from the tax in order to avoid the economic
consequences of increasing the cost of doing business.
Finally, AIM's leadership decided that tax incentives--
specific business deductions and tax credits given to busi-
nesses for specified actions--would be a surrogate for tax
rate reductions. They had several advantages. Since incen-
tives reduced the effective tax rate for firms taking advan-
tage of them, the incentive laws could specifically be written
to benefit their membership. But, more important, since the
actual tax rates were not changed, people would not be aware
of the tax losses accruing from incentives. They would not
engender popular opposition and politicians would be more
willing to vote for them.
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The Political Response
Until the last decade, the two major political parties in
Massachusetts had distinctly different philosophies. The
Republican party, suspicious of state intervention in the pri-
vate sector, stood for limited government, a sound fiscal base
and minimum government interference in the market place.
Taxes were to be avoided but, if the state needed them, a
sales tax was preferable to an income, business or property
tax.
The Democratic party, on the other hand, believed in
government as an intervenor in the economy to solve unequal
distribution of income and imperfections in the marketplace.
The party stood for programs protecting the worker and the
needy. Party members usually preferred a tax structure that
burdened the poor the least and the rich the most.
Members of both parties, however, have been reluctant to
make major changes in the tax structure, especially when they
involved a redistribution of income. Their political
instincts told them that the electorate supported tax reduc-
tions and disapproved of tax revisions which might increase
their taxes. They approved of major revisions in the tax laws
only with the greatest reluctance. Often this happened when
state revenues were down and the only other alternative was a
drastic reduction in electorate services. But if taxes were
to be raised, which tax should be increased: sales, income,
property, or business taxes?
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At one time, the Democrats would have said "raise busi-
ness taxes." But since the Second World War, the Democratic
party had been trying to win business' favor. Both parties
began competing for the label of being more pro-business. As
a result, a politician's position on business tax matters was
more a function of his particular office or leadership role
than his party label.
For instance, governors behaved differently than legisla-
tors. The state's top officials, the office holders ultima-
tely responsible for balancing the state budget, were less
sympathetic to business tax reduction that could reduce state
revenues than state legislators. In 1968, for example, the
Democratic chairman and vice-chairman of the Joint Taxation
Committee advocated a reduction in the corporate income tax
rate from 7.5 percent to 7 percent. They said that reducing
the business tax rate would build a healthy economic climate:
There is no reason why the state can't do as the
federal government has done successfully and use
sound tax policy to build a healthy economic
situation. The bill setting a special tax rate for
manufacturers who must compete with those in other
states to survive, indicates that our committee is
not just interested in raising revenue but also in
developing economic policy that can generate even
more revenue in the future. 2
But the Republican governor, John Volpe, opposed the
revenue reducing proposal, and it died in the legislature
2 Quote of Senate Chairman George Kenneally, Jr. of the
Joint Legislature Taxation Committee in "They Write Our Tax
Laws: A Key Committee Helps Build a New Image for All
Legislature While Searching for More Dollars for the State,"
Industry 33, No. 8 (June 1968): 32.
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after an unsuccessful attempt to override the governor's veto.
A similar event occurred the following year. By that time,
John Volpe had left the governor's office for a federal
appointment in Washington. His replacement was Frank Sargent,
a liberal Republican.
Even with employment at an eleven-year low in the state
that year, businesspeople were talking about the need for
business tax reductions to induce more prosperity in the
state. The newly elected Democratic Speaker of the House, 34-
year-old ex-school teacher, David Bartley, believed that a
reduction in the corporate income tax would reduce business
costs, expand production and ultimately create more jobs. But
once again, a Republican governor disagreed. Sargent called
business tax rate reductions a simple break for a special
interest group. Once again, a Republican governor vetoed a
Democratic-sponsored business tax reduction.
But while governors were loathe to support reductions in
business taxes, there was less resistance to tax incentives.
Governor Sargent, for instance, said that tax incentives were
valuable because there was a cause and effect relationship
between the objectives of the incentives and their accomplish-
ments. In addition, the revenue loss was small. But, gover-
nors were not the only supports of tax incentives.
Legislators also liked the idea of reducing business taxes
while keeping the rate constant.
The demand for specially designed tax credits and incen-
tives by the business community has increased over the past
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decade. In part, the demand was accelerated by AIM's realiza-
tion that the competition between the two parties and the
Democrats' desire to appear more pro-business could be used to
their advantage. In 1970, during a period of heavy business
criticism, the Republican governor supported a number of
Democratic proposals--including a bill which gave manufac-
turing companies a one percent tax credit for investing in new
plant and equipment. He later endorsed tax deductions to
industries for installing pollution equipment as well as tax
credits for hiring disadvantaged workers.
By the end of the seventies, over ten tax incentive laws
were passed by the Democratic legislature. They included a
new 3 percent tax credit on new investments, a limit in tax
liability of expanded business payrolls, a tax credit for
hiring individuals from public assistance rolls and a 100 per-
cent deduction for industrial water treatment facilities and
air pollution control. Called Mass Incentives, a state offi-
cial proudly announced that they were:
. -..positive steps to help keep business profitable
and make Massachusetts a state with a healthy tax
climate.
Business leaders also praised the politician's
willingness to pass new business tax incentives. In par-
ticular, the business community, through AIM, was delighted by
the Democratic leaderships' new role in getting the incentives
through the legislature. They finally had a mechanism--
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albeit limited -- for reducing their business tax burden.
Writing Tax Laws
Before the popularity of incentives, legislators were
often faced with the difficult decision about how to say 'no'
to the business community or other groups wanting a tax change
without offending it. One tactic used by legislators reluc-
tant to alter the tax structure was to decide that they did
not have enough information on a subject to make a decision.
They then put the matter of tax revision in some kind of study
commission. Because of the continual business demand for
changes in their taxes, the subject of many studies has been
business taxes. Often times, their conclusions were contradic-
tory. For example, a 1959 study done by the Commission on the
Audit of the State said that the business tax did not
influence the location of firms. But two years later, the
state tax commission claimed that the complex business tax
laws made it difficult to attract and keep industries in the
state. 3
Except under unusual circumstances, significant changes
in the tax rates were initially proposed by the governor, spe-
cial comissions, or less frequently, business associations.
According to one long-time tax administrator, it often took
several years for the legislature to agree to change the law:
3 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Audit on State Needs:
New Industries For Massachusetts (Boston, 1959) House 2649;
Massachusetts State Tax Commission, (Boston, 1962) H. 3658.
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In most cases, major tax legislation went through
only if the governor proposed it. In rare cases,
business associations made recommendations.
Sometimes can get changes if special commissions. .
put forth ideas that could be enacted. Their ideas
may not immediately get enacted but a few years down
the road someone will pick it up and it will. . .
There were some exceptions. Business tax changes that
were technical changes in the formula or eligibility require-
ments and did not change the rate, were, in fact, relatively
easy to implement. The reasons were obvious; technical
changes in the law were unlikely to become a public issue and
anger private citizens, jeopardizing the jobs of state offi-
cials. In addition, as the tax administrator explained, tech-
nical changes in the laws would often have less consequence
for public programs since the changes affected a very small
percentage of the budget. Because they dealt with business
taxes, a consensus about revisions was also easier to arrive
at:
I think it is easier to change business tax law than
personal income tax law. . .not dealing as much in
revenue. . .also dealing with more compact group.
it is a limited taxpayer's group since 90 percent
of the tax from business (is) from ten percent of
the group.
The House and Senate Chairman of the Joint Legislative
Tax Committee and their staff oversaw the writing of the tax
revisions. But there were problems with the process. The
staff of the committee, many of whom were appointed because of
political connections, had little tax experience when they
arrived. They learned on the job. But staff salaries were
low, and there was substantial employee turnover. Thus, only
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a few acquired the experience to be well versed in the intri-
cacies of business tax law.
Most of the chairmen were not technicians and depended on
others--their staff, officials from the Department of
Revenues or lobbyists--to advise them. But at times, they
could not find anyone who could explain the significance of a
proposal before the committee. For example, faced in 1978
with an insurance led but governor supported bill to revise
the insurance tax laws, the committee chairman could not find
anyone knowledgeable in insurance tax laws. As one committee
staff member recounted, the legislature had to pass the
insurance bill without ever understanding its content:
No one knows about insurance tax laws. . .even the
insurance experts don't know. . .still don't know
why the insurance companies were willing to swap a
tax on their net investment for a one percent rate
on the gross investment. . .key is the interpreta-
tion of the IRS code. No one up here has that
knowledge.
The Committee passed the bill because the governor and
the insurance companies warned of ominous results if they
didn't. In fact, insurance companies threatened to leave the
state if the legislature did not act favorably. But insurance
companies were obviously not alone in wanting their taxes
reduced. As a result, there was a difference of opinion among
different business sectors about which tax changes should be
made by the legislature. But differences among members of the
business community were rarely publicized. Unless one
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sector's proposal threatened another sector's power or pro-
fits, the business community took a laissez-faire approach to
each other's suggestions. If there was an important self-
interest issue, a business lobbyist was likely to talk priva-
tely to a legislative leader about revising or stopping the
other's bill before it became law. For instance, AIM's lob-
byists were displeased by a Jobs for Massachusetts proposal to
give tax credits to firms hiring disadvantaged workers. But
rather than publicly disagree with the organization, the manu-
facturing association's lobbyists went along with a watered
down version of the bill.
AIM's lobbyists made reasonable requests. One example of
that practicality was AIM's acceptance of tax incentives.
While the manufacturing association preferred a reduction in
the tax rate to tax incentives, its leaders realized the poli-
tical popularity of tax incentives. A former public official
explained AIM's philosophy:
Tax incentives (are) used more now because of
political acceptance. . .I think. . .AIM is
practical. . .knows not to put all its efforts
into losing propositions.
This reasonableness combined with their relationship with
legislators and technical expertise gave AIM unusual access.
The tax committee naturally turned to AIM's lobbyists when
they wanted the private sector's opinion about how to improve
the business tax:
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We ask what is the realm of the possible this year. .
if there is a little piece of legislation that will
really help [we] emphasize that.
A key committee staff recounted the exchange that took
place with AIM's lobbyists in 1978:
We said. . .all right. What do you want this year?
They said the export sales. I said that is enough.
"Export sales" was shorthand for revising the tax law to
exclude export sales from the apportionment formula. The for-
mula determines the amount of taxes a business pays to the
state. Although the bill easily passed both houses and was
signed into law, the change probably had a major impact on
state revenues. While no cost estimate was ever made on the
change, one staff member estimated that the change would cost
the state as much as $50 million a year. As he said:
They got a big present with the export exclusion and
no one will ever know since we do not have the
research capability.
Why was it passed? According to the same staff member,
the bill was proposed:
. . .to help a couple of local businessmen who were
doing a lot of export sales. It was one of those
things that you have to give up for the business
climate.
A Display of Conflict
Up to this point, business tax policy has illustrated the
rule of conduct by which one group of firms--marginal firms--
controlled the formation of tax policy because of the reluc-
tant acceptance of their leadership by growth firms. Yet
recent events have given evidence of the fragility of such
resolutions. Growing electorate dissatisfaction with rising
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inflation and government spending created the conditions by
which the organizations representing marginal and growth firms
were forced to take different public stands on the direction
of tax policy. The impetus for this situation was the
Citizens for a Limited Taxation (CLT), a libertarian
organization which organized a petition drive to place
"Proposition 2 2" on the November 1980 ballot in Massachusetts.
The proposition limited municipal expenditures to 2 / percent
of the full and fair market value of property.
At first, both AIM and MHTC supported the proposal and
assisted in collecting petition names. MHTC had always advo-
cated reducing personal and property taxes--an action it
thought could help attract skilled employees to the state--as
the most effective pro-business tax policy the state could
implement. Thus, CLT's proposal was attractive to the MHTC
members. In addition, MHTC members viewed their participation
in a successful referendum campaign as a way of getting more
power to influence public policy. The chairman of the
legislature's taxation committee did not even believe that
those behind the MHTC support of Proposition 2 / liked the
proposal:
High Tech [members] are forcing "2 /" even though
they don't want it and know it won't work. They are
using it to get leverage for what they do want.
As November approached, however, AIM's officials were
unhappy enough with the referendum to split from the coali-
tion. Although they initially supported the bill out of a
sense of wanting to be united with the rest of the business
community, there were several problems. Most important, a
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significant number of legislators, including the leadership,
were vehemently, but privately, opposed to the referendum and
AIM feared a loss of access at the legislature if they con-
tinued to support the bill. Further, the associations' offi-
cials worried that the success of the proposition, which was
on the ballot in the form of a law and a constitutional amend-
ment, would set a precedent for changes in the constitution
that consolidated state power. They preferred a decentralized
to a centralized system of government.
Yet, even with their influence, AIM's lobbyists could not
convince legislators to support a compromise proposal. As a
result, the referendum passed easily, with over a ten percent
plurality. Although MHTC's support of the proposition angered
many legislators, the association gained added respect at the
state house. In a rare display of public disagreement, MHTC
had won an important battle with the older and more influen-
tial trade association, AIM, over the proper business tax stra-
tegy. The consensus over the formation of business tax policy
no longer existed.
II. Environmental Policy
The goal of economic growth and prosperity often
conflicts with the desire for a clean environment. As in
other issues, legislators are interested in developing a con-
sensus among different groups on an environmental policy. In
this situation, the major party in the effort to improve the
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'little' state's environment are representatives of special
interest groups representing a small, but vocal, segment of
the electorate. Business interests most concerned with the
detrimental effect of a strong environmental policy include
AIM, utility companies, and construction companies.
Resolution by Task Force: The Environmental Movement
Who initiates reforms? The assumption among those who
believe that reforms are legitimate is that some interest
groups motivate politicans to accept change. But oftentimes,
other conditions were present that sometimes aided and someti-
mes directed the public movement.
A typical example of reform in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts was the strengthening of the environmental
policy. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has always had a
concern, albeit limited, for maintaining a decent environment.
The country's first state conservation body was started in
Massachusetts in 1891. The state was the forerunner in the
movement to protect wetlands from unruly development. It was
also the leader in forestry control and in legislating incen-
tives to entice localities to preserve open spaces.
But the Commonwealth's preoccupation with an improved
environment really began in the nineteen seventies. There
were a number of reasons for the timing. Most significantly,
1970 was the year of the environment--not only in
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Massachusetts but around the country as well. This was a
period in our history when grass roots organizing was focussed
around the issue of a cleaner environment, the culmination of
which was Earth Day, celebrated by millions of U.S. citizens.
The issue that captured the attention of the media, also cap-
tured the attention of the state and local officials.
Whether the electorate in particular Massachusetts
districts really cared about environmental policy or voted
elected officials into office on the basis of their record on
environmental legislation was frequently an unknown factor.
What was known, however, was the favorable media coverage
given to environmental activists; politicians thought that the
same kind of publicity might be given them if they supported
the efforts of environmentalists.
In fact, the actual state house lobbying done by the
handful of environmental associations--The Sierra Club, the
Massachusetts Forest and Parks Association and the Audubon
Society--had the reputation of being relatively ineffective.4
As inexperienced lobbyists, they too often limited their advo-
cacy to speaking at public hearings and issuing information
sheets to legislators, neither of which were particularly
effective techniques.
4 For a discussion of the politics of the environment,
see Laura Lake, "Massachusetts: A Case Study of the Politics
of the Environment" (P.H.D. dissertation, Tufts University,
1972.)
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There were several other reasons for elected officials to
support environmental legislation. The leaders of both par-
ties endorsed the concept of environmental reform. The
Republicans in the legislature knew that the governor of the
state, Republican Frank Sargent, had made the environment one
of his highest priorities.5 The Democrats in the legislature
were also aware that their two leaders, the Speaker of the
House and the Senate President were proponents who had spon-
sored a local "Earth Day" to draw attention to the issue.
To add to the atmosphere, the vast majority of business
community leaders were either silent or not strongly opposed
to new environmental legislation. Although some speculated
that business leaders were naive about the effects of new
legislation, it was also true that business leaders were aware
of the movement's strength and hoped merely to have a
moderating influence on the direction of that policy.
One thing business wanted was to convince the legislators
to provide them with tax credits and abatements and low
interest loans to meet increasingly stringent pollution stan-
dards. In 1970 alone, over fifty-eight environmental bills
were passed and signed into law. Most dealt with water-
5 See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Address of His Honor
The Lieutenant Governor, Acting Governor of the Commonwealth
Relative to the Concerns of the Commonwealth, (Boston, 1970)
Senate No. 1.
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pollution abatement facilities and standards and included
several business incentives.
The next several years were increasingly productive ones
for environmentalists, culminating in 1973 when two major laws
were enacted by the Commonwealth. One reorganized the
environmental agency from forty-nine decentralized departments
into four, giving one department, the Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE), the power to issue
health and environmental permits required by municipalities
and expanding plants. The second significant law passed that
year was the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA), a statute that gave the newly reorganized Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs the right to review and ulti-
mately reject new development in the state.
The Speaker Halts the Movement
But two years later, the situation had completely
changed. The economy, which began to decline in the early
seventies, was now in the midst of a serious recession.
Instead of the environmental movement, the media now talked
about the energy crisis and the high cost of oil. There was
also a complete turnover in political leadership.
The new governor, Michael Dukakis, preferred secretaries
who were young, intelligent generalists. Often, they had no
special training in their department's area of responsibility.
For example, Evelyn Murphy, the Secretary of the Office of
Environmental Affairs, was an economist rather than an
The new secretary was obviously aware ofenvironmentalist.
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economic conditions. She was also aware that the governor
placed a high priority on improving the state's economy.
From the start, Dr. Murphy broadened the legislative mandate
of her office from one of protecting the environment to pro-
tecting the environment and improving the economy. As an
economist, she had an expansive definition of economic growth
-- one which included revitalizing the older cities, and nur-
turing small but important sectors like the fishing industry.
In her view, the goals of a strong economy and environment
were interdependent, not conflicting. To meet these goals,
she saw her job as finding shared objectives among different
interest groups. Often, this meant resolving conflicts bet-
ween different economic interests wanting access to natural
resources.
Most lobbyists understood and accepted the enormous
powers given to the new secretary under MEPA because, as one
lobbyist explained," . . .the downtown banks and bondholders
just learned to live with it." But one group didn't: either
through ignorance or lack of information, building contractors
and road builders, principal subjects of the law, never really
understood the regulations' implications until they were
enforced.
Once they realized the restrictions placed upon them by
MEPA's regulations, the builders turned to the legislative
leadership for relief. While sympathetic to business's
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complaints, the Senate President, Kevin Harrington had a good
relationship with Secretary Murphy and his staff had already
resolved their MEPA problems with the secretary.6
The Speaker of the House, however, had a different reac-
tion. First, the Speaker, who lived in an old and poor
industrial city where there was a lack of decent homes and
services for citizens, had little sympathy with the
environmentalists' demand for open space, a cleaner environ-
ment and an uncluttered coastline. In his mind, environmen-
talists were people who lived in suburban towns--not the
voters he represented and with whom he grew up.
Second, the newly appointed Speaker, had a limited
acquaintance with the Secretary of Environmental Affairs. He
reacted to the complaints by cutting the Secretary's office
budget, making it clear at the same time that he considered
environmental progrmas to be competing with the more important
programs that provided jobs and direct services.
How could Secretary Murphy resolve the Speaker's objec-
tions without altering the MEPA law? She formed a task force
6 The good relationship between the two was, in large
part, due to the excellent working relationship that developed
between Secretary Murphy and a lobbyist for a major utility
company, who, not incidentally, was a close friend of the
Senate President.
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made up of public and private representatives that met and
could agree to a set of regulation changes. But the task
force was a public relations technique. Privately, she worked
with key people in the Speaker's office to accept certain
nominal changes in the regulations. Once they worked out an
agreement, this decision became an accepted fact. Since other
business lobbyists had already agreed to the law, the road and
building contractors had little choice but to accept the
Secretary's privately negotiated modifications.
But the conflict between the Secretary and the Speaker
did not end with MEPA. A second event, which took place in
1977, made him equally upset. A year before, the federal
government had passed the Coastal Zone Management Act,
legislation designed to encourage the planning and conser-
vation of the nation's coastline. Under the law, states were
asked to prepare coastal zone plans, which if approved, were
given federal assistance to put into effect. Since the
federal government did not specify the method by which states
should implement their plans, Secretary Murphy decided that
Massachusetts, with its 1200 miles of coastline, had suf-
ficient enabling legislation to allow her to simply promulgate
a set of rules and regulations. In taking this approach, she
need only hold public hearings before issuing the plan and
could thereby avoid having to go the less predictable route
through the legislature.
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Several business representatives, most notably those who
earned their living from fishing and other coastal business,
praised the rules and regulations drawn up by Dr. Murphy as
encouraging development as well as protecting the coastline.
But a larger and more vocal segment of the business community,
led by the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, was upset by
the process and outcome of the deliberations.
Once again, the Speaker reacted to businesses' com-
plaints. First, he warned the U.S. Department of Commerce,
which had control over the Coastal Zone Management Act, that
he would strip the state's environmental office of its powers
and budget if the department approved and funded her planning
document. He then demanded that Secretary Murphy meet the
objections of the business community and change the rules and
regulations.
The Secretary again responded by forming a task force of
individuals that could "officially" deal with the criticism by
developing an acceptable set of regulation changes.
Comprising the Task Forces
Since the task force method of resolving disputes between
her agency and the business community became the "modus
operandi" it is worth examining the process in more detail.
Clearly, this method of resolution had the advantage of
allowing her to keep the formulation of environmental policy
in the executive branch. But what was the result? Several
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people interviewed thought that the task forces reduced the
Secretary's power to ruling by committee. Others believed
that the task forces were brilliant contrivances that appeased
business leaders without modifying policies.
Although there were few rules attached to the formulation
of task forces, several staff members in the executive office
said that Secretary Murphy had an unofficial maximum amount
of change (or minimum standard) that she would allow.
Anything below that level, (or above the standard), was to be
decided by the group that eventually met. Consequently, her
most important job was finding the proper mix of people to
invite on particular task forces. Obviously, they should be
some combination of business, environmental, legislative and
administrative leadership. With respect to the business com-
munity, whether the business leaders were associated with
business that were marginal or growth, a trade association or
an individual enterprise was less important than that they
should satisfy one or more of the following criteria: the
firms represented were the ones that objected to the initial
action or policy, had influence at the legislature, had an
interest in participating in such decision, or had technical
knowledge useful to the group. As it happened, however, many
of the businesses that satisfied the criteria were marginal
firms concerned about the impact of environmental legislation
on the cost of doing business.
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The purpose of the task forces was to get a consensus
between business, government and environmentalists and other
interest groups about the direction of public policy. Group
pressure and ethics provided the mechanism which ensured the
success of the method. A frequent participant in these deli-
berations explained the values that made the consensus work.
Loyalty is the most important thing. You never go
back on your work. If AIM goes 'off the
reservation,' in a compromise, they have to answer
back to the whole group so that they would not kill
a bill at the end of a compromise.
Because ethics made participating businesses defend a
consensus to which they were a party, the selection of busi-
ness leaders was key to developing a conflict free public
policy. And since there were many business points of view, it
made sense to include as many of them as possible in the
deliberations.
Secretary Murphy also wanted labor represented on the
committees. But with the exception of the building trades
union, which had an interest in construction regulations, it
was difficult to find labor officials willing to participate
and they were often underrepresented on task forces.
Without question, a group of articulate environmentalists
was needed to balance businesses' needs with the constituents'
point of view. As a liberal who viewed a good environment and
economy as being closely related, Secretary Murphy considered
it in the public's interest to have constituency well repre-
sented on the committee. Most often, she selected lobbyists
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or officers of environmental associations already active in
environmental legislation and policy.
While it was not difficult to find informed environmen-
talists, there were questions about their motivation. What
would prompt them to be willing to participate in an unpubli-
cized venture which could mean the loss of some already won
reforms? As it happened,.environmental lobbyists were not
only willing to participate, but liked the use of the task
force as a vehicle for formulating public policy. The task
force forum ensured them that they, like the business
community, would have a major part in policy deliberations.
Further, environ mental groups were not anti-business. In
fact, some groups like the Audubon Society, with its 26,000
members, had close ties with the business community, depending
upon it for corporate membership dues, special donations and
even lent personnel. Many Audubon Society members were also
corporate officers who were as concerned about the economy as
the environment.
But beyond these reasons, inviting environmental advoca-
tes who lobbied meant getting people experienced at
compromising--people who agreed that quiet, unpublicized nego-
tiations were more effective than confrontations or
disagreement. To them, holding strong, unbending positions
about an issue and then allowing the debate to become public
and publicized through the media hardened positions and often
made solutions difficult if not impossible. The unsuccessful
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confrontation politics of a returnable bottle bill was evi-
dence to these lobbyists of the wrong type of strategy.7
Yet even if confrontations were successful in the short
run, lobbying organizations concerned with a number of
environmental issues did not want the reputation of being
unreasonable on issues and difficult to work with. A lobbyist
for a major environmental association, for example, argued
that coalition building was complex and alliances frequently
shifted among different interest groups. Even members of the
business community could be helpful in getting legislation
that does not affect them through the legislature. For this
reason, she preferred that differences on any one issue be
worked over privately, away from the media and legislators.
In essence, the task force approach was the perfect vehicle
for implementing this strategy.
The final group, elected officials, was the most impor-
tant. Three types of elected officials were asked to serve on
the task force: knowledgeable legislators, committee chairmen
7 A returnable bottle bill has been unsuccessfully intro-
duced in over five legislature sessions by environmental acti-
vists. Unions have joined with the trade association and
bottle bill company lobbyists to successfully stop the bill.
Although the bill has had the support (and coverage) of the
media and most liberal organizations, they have not been able
to translate these endorsements into legislative support. In
addition, the media coverage given the issue has polarized
positions and, as has been alleged by some, made it difficult
for a consensus to be reached between the sides.
-133-
(if a bill was the likely result) and legislative leaders (or
their designees). Only committee chairmen sometimes balked at
participating in the negotiations which might threaten the
separation of powers between the branches of government by not
allowing the legislators their own separate deliberative pro-
cess. But their presence was unimportant if aides to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House served on the task
force. In addition to being helpful in designing rules and
regulations which would not anger elected officials, the
leaderships' participation often resulted in their sponsorship
of legislation that came out of the task force. And sponsorship
by the two top legislative leaders guaranteed a bill's success.
The Agencies Use of Task Forces
Many departments within the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs organized task forces to promulgate
rules and regulations affecting business. This time, business
participation depended upon interest. For instance, AIM's
lobbyists, mirroring the concerns of its membership, were pri-
marily concerned with water and air pollution regulations.
The Homebuilders Association were involved in the task forces
dealing with land development. Utility companies had an
interest in pollution, hazardous waste and development issues.
The fishing and oil companies participated in coastal water
regulations. Finally, the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce
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took part in task forces dealing with growth and transpor-
tation policies.
Having a business representative on a particular task
force did not mean that the task force would succeed. Some
representatives were more helpful and active than others. In
addition, representatives were often the most active and
helpful if given a leading role on a particular task force.
Such was the case with the part of DEQE which enforced
environmental quality standards. A regional engineer at the
department worked closely with AIM's representatives, both on
collecting data to use in regulating emissions and in assisting
the department to develop a consensus in task force meetings.
In comparison with individual businesses, which were often
reluctant to comply with the expensive regulation, he praised
AIM's commitment to a decent environment and genuinely doubted
he could do his job without its assistance:
AIM is very cooperative . . . they will step
in at the appropriate time and will sit down
with us and work out a compromise. They
represent a generalized viewpoint so that
they can be very helpful.
But when there was little to be gained from cooperative
business lobbyists, especially from AIM, could be
obstructionists. DEQE also sponsored a series of task forces
on how to meet the federal provisions of the Federal Clean Air
Act of 1977. Since the federal standard were set by law, the
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object of the task forces was to determine a schedule of
implementation which would least disrupt the private sector.
For the most part, the decisions were a matter of timing and
not policy. At these sessions, AIM's lobbyist was seen as
ineffective and too demanding. A DEQE spokesperson described
his feelings about AIM's lobbyist role on the task forces:
AIM will exaggerate the effects. It is
the same old rhetoric every time. He comes
in five minutes before the end of the meet-
ing and disrupts it by giving his oratory.
Then he is always calling and setting up
meetings for committees to talk to the
director.
Still, the task force system succeeded in appeasing the
business community. By the end of Secretary Murphy's reign,
she was praised by the politicians as being politically
astute, by most members of the business community as
understanding their pressures and needs and by environmental
lobbyists as an effective environmentalist. No one, including
the media, objected to government by task force or the lack of
a public process or debate.
III. Labor Legislation
Government by consensus was not unique to the Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs. Labor policy has been
decided by the method of consensus for years. But in this
-136-
situation, the process was not a task force of interested par-
ties but the negotiations of two dominant and opposing
representatives--for labor, the State Labor Council of
AFL-CIO, and for industry, AIM.
The method was a matter of custom rather than calculated
decision. Most of the significant labor legislation in the
Commonwealth passed in the early part of the twentieth
century. It was the first state in the union to enact a ten-
hour work day for children and while weak, stipulating only
that an adequate minimum wage be given to all workers, the
first to enact a minimum wage law. The state set a precedent
for other states in the country by regulating safety in the
work place through the establishment of standards and inspec-
tions of stationary boilers. It was a pioneer in passing
protective labor laws for women, many of which were late
extended for men.
The conflict over the propriety and wisdom of labor pro-
tection laws came at a time when there was a limited admi-
nistrative bureaucracy and a strong legislature. For a
period, the conflict was public--the Democrats taking the side
of labor and the Republicans representing the businessman.
But as the Democrats increased their majority in both houses
and developed closer alliances with the business community, a
forum for deciding labor policy developed in the legislature
which emphasized private negotiation between the two represen-
tatives and deemphasized conflict and public confrontation.
-137-
Negotiating a Labor Policy
Even though eighty-five percent of the two million
workers in the state were not unionized in 1979--most of whom
worked in the service sector and high-technology firms--the
State Labor Council has been the dominant labor advocate in
the legislature. Although there were other unions, most
notably the Massachusetts Teacher Association and the United
Auto Workers--the State Council represented over ninety per-
cent of organized labor in the state and could easily claim
the title of being the most important labor organization in
the state. The counter part for the State Labor Council in
the legislature was AIM, the manufacturers association. in
1979, there were 2600 members in AIM employing 487,000
members. The average AIM member employed 187 workers. Like
the AFL-CIO, it represented the largest organized business
group operating in the Commonwealth.
During its early years, AIM led the opposition to a
number of labor laws, including the minimum wage protection,
the health and safety of women and children and even legisla-
tion increasing the compulsory school attendance age. But
after the early part of the twentiety century, the federal
government had taken over many of the powers to regulate the
work place and the states were no longer passing pathbreaking
labor laws. With few exceptions, both labor and industry were
focussing their legislative attention on two important labor
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programs already in law--workmen's compensation and
unemployment compensation benefits. Both were administered by
the state government, which set the level of benefits, but
paid for by private employers.
The two organizations had completely different approaches
to lobbying. AIM's staff, including its lawyers-lobbyists and
researchers, were bright, well-read individuals who acquire an
expertise in the complicated laws dealing with unemployment
compensation and workmen's compensation equaling their per-
sonal relationships with legislators. In comparison, the lob-
byists from the State Labor Council were uninformed about
technical issues, suspicious of politicians, and more at ease
organizing picket lines than in discussing the implications of
a legislative proposal. To make matters worse, the State
Labor Council had no back-up research staff and had to send
bills to the AFL-CIO Washington national office for review
before they would talk about them.
Even with such vastly different lobbying capabilities,
what was important to politicians, who had to contend with
re-election every two years, was that the two associations,
which represented most of labor and industry in the
Commonwealth, were 'friends' who could be counted on to deve-
lop a politically acceptable compromise that would not
threaten their re-elections. As a consequence, it became the
custom in the Commerce and Labor Committee which considered
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labor legislation, to have the two sides negotiate the set or
package of labor benefits that the legislature could pass each
year. The package would be one that pleased union workers,
who were constituents, without hurting business.
The political process rarely varied. Initially, the State
Labor Council and other trade associations would submit a
number of bills dealing with labor benefits and protections.
While some would provide for a new program, like a cash
sickness plan, or change a law, such as allowing unemployment
compensation benefits to be paid striking workers, most would
deal with the two major labor programs, unemployment compen-
sation and workmen's compensation.
Officially, at the public hearings on labor legislation
conducted by the Commerce and Labor Committee, AIM's represen-
tatives claimed that the enactment of any new labor law or
increased benefit would add to the cost of doing business in
the state and make it more difficult for industry to operate.
But unofficially, it would decide upon a counter-proposal and
strategy. Often, this was not an easy task. At one time, one
of AIM's most important members, General Electric, had its own
lobbyist who specialized in unemployment compenation and who
often disagreed with AIM's position. The two groups often had
to work out their differences in private. In addition, AIM's
lobbyists made decisions about how to change the laws which
often favored one group over another.
-140-
A major question was how to finance any increases in
benefits. For example, in 1962, during a recessionary period,
the unemployment compensation fund was depleted and needed
more money from contributing employers. But there were several
ways to improve the solvency of the fund. Those who were low
wage employers wanted it done by raising the maximum taxable
wage base. But firms that paid higher wages preferred that
the tax rate be increased. A former member of the Department
of Employment Security staff recalled the dilemma, which
resulted in both a new contribution rate schedule and a higher
wage base:
Accomodations had to be made between those
who wanted to raise the tax rate and those
who wanted to raise the taxable wage base.
The low wage employer, like department
stores, wanted to raise the taxable wage base
. . . other employers wanted to raise the rate,
so that there was a conflict. Also AIM had
a struggle between the apparel companies
which was a small industry and GE which
was a big industry. In the end, they went
to a new contribution rate schedule and a
higher wage base.
Once AIM had a position on how to resolve differences
within their membership, they would begin to negotiate the
"benefits" package with union lobbyists. Although frequently
meeting in a legislative room made available to them by the
Commerce and Labor Committee chairman, they preferred to work
without legislative staff or committee members present. For
instance, a staff person new to the committee asked to join
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the negotiations as a committee observer. Although the chair-
man of the committee agreed, the aide remembered the negotiators,
especially from AIM, as being unhappy with her presence:
The first time I worked with them was in a
bargaining session over unemployment compen-
sation. I remember being impressed with
AIM's lobbyists knowledge of the subject
which was very technical. I asked several
questions which were never answered and
generally was treated as an intruder into
a private process.
When the two parties could not immediately agree, nego-
tiations between the two parties extended over the legislative
session as labor waited for the Washington office to evaluate
all proposals during each step of the negotiation. Even then,
not all members of the business or labor committees were
pleased with the results. In particular, members of the High
Technology Council and a major Boston bank have continually
complained about the overly generous unemployment compensation
benefits paid workers in the state. But they have deferred to
their code of ethics--which allowed AIM, the primary agent,
the right to negotiate the benefits and did not allow then to
publicly criticize AIM, a member of the business community,
for their part in negotiating the level of benefits.
But it probably would do little good to complain. Unlike
Secretary Murphy, Labor and Commerce Committee chairmen pre-
ferred a process in which the State Labor Council and
AIM represented both sides. One committee staff member
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explained he supported the system because it saved the commit-
tee and him time:
They [AFL-CIO and AIM] agree on a workmen's
compensation bill and they work it out and
they say that everyone agrees and a month
later a major corporation like General
Electric will call and say what did you do
that for. I do not have the time to seek
out other groups.
Conclusion
The past chapter has described the process of resolving
conflict in a 'little' state. The conflicts arise from three
contradictions inherent in a market economy:
(a) Environmental Policy--the right to a clean environ-
ment versus the right of business to operate freely
in the marketplace;
(b) Labor Policy--the right of labor to have a decent
standard of living versus the right of business to
maximize its profits;
(c) Tax Policy--the right of individuals and businesses
to keep what they have received in wages and profits
versus the obligation of society to protect and
enhance the quality of life of its citizenry.
In two cases, environmental and labor policy, the state
has developed several successful forms of resolving conflict.
But consensus is a fragile condition, which depends as
much on the ability of the business community to work together
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as it does on the willingness of the electorate to work with
the business community. Thus, it is important to view busi-
ness tax policy as an illustration of how conflict can
re-emerge. In this situation, the public's concern about its
tax burden and the shifting power struggle between asso-
ciations representing marginal and growth firms set the stage
for the overturning of the traditional process by which busi-
ness tax policy is formed. In doing so, however, tax policy
became politicized, out of the control of politicians who want
to minimize conflict. Controversy and politicization of such
an issue can threaten the political futures of a number of
legislators.
CHAPTER V
A POLICY OF CONCESSION
The preceding chapter examined the process by which
conflict, arising out of the needs of varying interest groups
in a 'little' state, is resolved. As described, the method of
resolution took many forms and involved different constituent
and business groups.
There were also contradictory demands that were present in
the formulation of business promotion policy. But the form of
the conflict was more complicated. Unlike labor and environ-
mental reforms, policies that was supported by specific
interest groups, the electorate as a whole benefited from the
additional jobs and state revenues that were a result of an
aggressive and successful business promotion program. Yet, the
electorate rarely become involved in business promotion issues.
At the same time, opponents of a effective business promotion
program was a narrow interest group--existing businesses
already located in the 'little' state. For them, a policy
that resulted in the attraction of out-of-state businesses and
new start-ups also increaseed the competition for labor and
other inputs into the production process. Input prices rise,
bringing a corresponding decrease in the comparative advantage
of producing a good in the now input scarce region.1
1For some firms, additional industry is welcomed. In
these situations, agglomeration economics are present--the
recruitment of new business reduces the cost of production or
distribution for already existing businesses.
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To some extent, state officials formed the most clearly
defined interest group that benefited from a business promo-
tion program; an expanding economy provided jobs and revenues
that was enjoyed by voters. Yet paradoxically, government's
main objective was to minimize conflict. Was it possible to
minimize the conflict between the general populace, which pays
no attention to the policy, and existing businesses and, at
the same time, advocate for the policy that creates the
conflict? In a sense, the formulation of business promotion
is less an examination of the resolution of conflict than a
study of the types of concessions state officials make to spe-
cial business interests.
The Motivation for Promotion
It was January 1945. The war was almost over. In
Massachusetts, the voters had just elected Maurice Tobin, the
young Democratic mayor of Boston to be their new governor but
had, once again, returned a majority of Republicans to both
houses in the legislature.
During the war, problems of the economy were little
noticed as the government controlled the consumption of goods
and every able person was either serving in the armed forces
or gainfully employed at home. But the war's end meant that
many defense-related industries were no longer necessary. In
Massachusetts, fifteen percent of the state's work force lost
their jobs after the war. Local newspaper accounts were
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pessimistic, claiming that the state's economic future was
uncertain. Although sales of consumer goods were booming in
the country, writers assumed that few of those new sales would
originate from Massachusetts. Instead, newly formed companies
would locate in other states, where there was a better skilled
labor force, more plentiful natural resources, a lower cost of
business and an interest in technological innovation.
The new governor was obviously concerned. To revitalize
the economy and reduce unemployment, Tobin proposed re-
building the state's transportation network, including its
highways, airport and seaport. In addition, he urged the
establishment of a state agency to assist in the expansion and
relocation of industry in the state. Governor Tobin described
the purposes of the new department in his inaugural address:
In brief, this department would concern itself
with the maintenance, insofar as possible, of
present industry with the State, at a high
level of employment and prosperity; the security
of new industries and other enterprises; proper
post-war promotion of all resources. 2
There was precedent for establishing the department. The
Commonwealth already had a state planning board that prepared
limited physical and economic plans, and an industrial com-
mission to promote the state to out-of-state businesses.
2 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Address of His~
Excellency Maurice J. Tobin to the Two Branches of the
Legislature of Massachusetts (Boston, 1945) Senate no. 1.
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But to the new governor, the fact that several southern states
had established development agencies made both organiztions
outdated and the implementation of his own proposal urgent.
Unless Massachusetts responded with its own single, comprehen-
sive agency, he feared the state's competitive position would
worsen.
To win acceptance of the department with the Republican
majority in the legislature, Tobin formed a special
commission, headed by Joseph Kennedy, a well-known local
politician, who had recently served as the U. S. Ambassador to
Great Britain. The special commission reported back within
the year, enthusiastically endorsing the new department and
recommending that it receive a first-year budget of one
million dollars--an enormous outlay at that time. 3
To Tobin's dismay, the commission's report failed to
influence all the members of the state's business community.
Associations representing supporting sector establishments,
such as the retail trade association, backed the proposal
which promised to bring in new industry and thus trade into
the state. But manufacturers were less enthusiastic. While
some thought the department a good idea, others were not sure
that the addition of new industry would help them and were
3Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report of the Special
Commission Relative to Establishment of a State Department of
Commerce (Boston, 1945) House 300.
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less supportive, calling its implementation a waste of money.
In turn, Republican party members were persuaded by those
in the business community who opposed the idea. Dismissing
its merits, the Republicans in the legislature claimed that
the department would be nothing more than a source of patro-
nage for the Democratic party.
For seven years, the Republican majority in the legisla-
ture blocked efforts to establish a department of commerce.
But, in 1953, a newly elected Republican governor, Christian
Herter, broke with party tradition and endorsed the establish-
ment of the department. Using the influence of his office, he
successfully convinced his Republican colleagues in the
legislature to abolish the state planning board and the
Massachusetts Development and Industrial Commission and in
their place, pass the bill authorizing a Department of
Commerce.
Serving the Establishment
Officially, the department has always had two purposes--
to expand existing industry in the state and to attract
industries from other states. Since the agency has never had
regulatory or police powers, it has had to depend upon its
technical assistance skills to fulfill its dual objectives.
For example, in the department's first year of operation, it
had three divisions--research, planning and development, and
promotion. The agency's actual duties ranged from working
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with local development groups to providing site and tax infor-
mation to prospective business relocatees.
The agency was renamed the Department of Commerce and
Development in 1964 and temporarily given the additional
responsibilities of urban renewal, housing and tourist
development. But by 1969, the housing and urban renewal func-
tions had been transferred to another agency and the depart-
ment returned to the more narrow mission of expanding the
state's economic base.
The department has never been very effective at its
mission. In turn, there have been a number of explanations
for the department's failure. The most obvious was that the
mission was impossible; development is a natural process and
can only be marginally assisted by the public sector. But
even if this were true, the relationship between the business
community and the department increased the department's
ineffectiveness.
To a great degree, the failure developed because the
department found it easier to serve the tangible business
community rather than some broad objective like the needs of
the economy. One part of the business community was the set
of firms already operating in the Commonwealth; the department
staff devoted enormous attention to this group of
constituents. While the Secretary of Economic Affairs and the
Commissioner of the department had to serve other 'masters' as
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well, especially government, defending unpopular actions of
governor or his administration to the private sector, the
Secretary and Commissioner accepted and even supported the
department staff's single-mindedness.
For the staff, the crucial question became how best to
serve the existing business community. Since they wanted to
expand the economy, the staff designed programs like state
mortgage gurantees and technical site assistance, which helped
expanding or relocating firms to move into new headquarters.
A number of growth firms have taken advantage of these
services, especially the mortgage guarantee which reduced
interest rates on mortgages. But many growth firms had their
own financial sources and were impatient with the slow process
of approval required under the mortgage guarantee program. In
addition, the vast majority of firms already located in
Massachusetts were either too small to qualify or not planning
to expand or relocate in the foreseeable future.
What did the vast majority of existing businesses want
government to do? Most officials of firms cared little about
government policy and left legislative matters to their trade
associations, if they had one. In fact, unless required to by
some law, they rarely became involved in governmental matters.
But it was during these times that business became aware of
the value of having an advocate in government. They learned
that they could call the Department of Commerce and
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Development and complain about the decisions of another part of
state government that limited their operations and required
them to do something against their will. Often referred by
trade associations, the firms asked the department to inter-
vene with the 'offending' agency on behalf of the firm.
Because the department staff wanted to be helpful, they
took on the role of mediator between the public agencies and
firms seeking some type of relief, including arranging
meetings with disgruntled businessmen before tax department
officials, calling upon the Secretary of Environmental Affairs
to reconsider a decision made by one of her agencies and even
requesting town or city officials to cooperate with businesses
about getting a stop light or expediting the red-tape needed
to provide a plant expansion. Although they had no power,
department officials tried to persuade other government agen-
cies of the economic importance of cooperating with the busi-
ness community. They were often successful.
While the department accepted all requests for help, it
designed its programs to serve large-scale manufacturing
firms. For example, the department contacted every firm in
the state to tell them about its service, but limited the con-
tact to manufacturing firms which employed more than 20
employees and service establishments with over 50 employees.
In addition, the technical assistance it offered businesses
beyond its ombudsman role--obtaining mortgage guarantees for
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construction and rehabilitation of commercial and industrial
buildings, providing sites for relocation and providing infor-
mation on tax credits, incentives and employment training
programs--were most helpful to large firms. Small businesses
needed assistance in marketing, pricing and short-term
financing, services not available in the department or
elsewhere in the state government.
The decision to help a small segment of the private sec-
tor was not uniformly welcomed by the department staff. They
wanted to be advocates to all business in the state. Although
understanding the reasons for limiting their efforts, a
department staff member expressed a common opinion in the
department about the exclusionary policy:
Yes, I think small businesses have been
neglected. It is political reality
because it gets more press to get numbers
of people employed. But the bread and
butter of the state is small business.
In fact, the decision to limit its focus was made, not by
the Commissioner, but by the Secretary of Economic Affairs.
He had two reasons. As the staff member explained, one reason
was political--the governor and his administration received
more media publicity and credit for solving the problems of
major businesses in the state. In addition, the Secretary
reasoned that efficient use of staff time demanded that they
help only firms that could retain significant numbers of
workers. Although the Secretary could not force the depart-
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ment to comply, his power to decide its budget made the deci-
sion pro-forma.
Eliminating Competition
Assisting domestic companies was supposed to be only a
part of the department's responsibilities. It was also
expected to attract firms from other states and countries.
But, in actuality, there was little outside solicitation.
Governor Dukakis was the one who de-emphasized the impor-
tance of out-of-state recruiting. Basing his attitude on
research done by his staff and others, he decided that the
possibility of attracting new firms or branch plants to the
state from other states was minimal. But what about foreign
companies? His administration supported the idea of bringing
in firms from overseas. In addition, despite what domestic
forms were saying about the state's business climate, foreign
firms producing technologically advanced products could advan-
tageously locate in Massachusetts. According to a department
official responsible for recruiting foreign businesses,
Massachusetts had a comparative advantage:
Foreign companies can build companies in
Massachusetts for one-third to one-half
the cost of that in Europe. For those
companies with high value added, Massa-
chusetts is natural. Unionization is
less of a concern for foreign companies
than domestic companies. For a foreign
company that is either used to communists
or trade union arrangements that are
unbelievable or. . . where they cannot
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shut down the company, this looks like
an absolutely beautiful environment. We
have a nice mix of union/nonunion companies
that exist side by side and the unionizing
pressure is nothing like New Jersy, Tennes-
see, or North Carolina where the unions are
very aggressive.
But individual businesses as well as trade associations,
especially the High Technology Council, were privately opposed
to the campaign to recruit foreign firms. Many of the firms
that would be recruited were likely to be high technology
products.
Massachusetts-based high technology firms paid their
workers less than the national average for high technology
jobs. 4 They obviously did not want firms relocating to
Massachusetts, competing for labor, and as a result, bidding
up workers' wages. Instead, officials from the high tech-
nology sector told Governor Dukakis and his staff that public
resources would be better spent on providing additional
training program in computer science and other pertinent
skills.
Business Involvement in the Department
While department officials generally disagreed with this
attitude, believing in the value of competition and economic
4 For a general discussion of wages see Lynn E. Browne,
"How Different Are Regional Wages," New England Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, January-February
(Boston, 1978), pp. 33-43. See also Michael Segal, "High
Tech," The Phoenix, pp. 46 and 48.
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growth, they did not want to antagonize the growth sector of
the economy. Thus, little attention was given to the firm
recruitment program.
Instead, department staff hoped to elicit the support of
existing businesses to revitalize and improve the department's
operation. But their requests for firm involvement were
largely ignored. Even trade associations saw little value in
getting involved in the affairs of the department.
As a result, the several attempts by the department to
organize a business advisory board were unsuccessful. For
example, the department started the Foreign Business Council,
a group of fifty prominent local business leaders active in
international trade, to help it make contact with foreign com-
panies that might be interested in locating in the state.
But the council made few referrals and the names they did pro-
vide did not respond to inquiries from the department.
Businesses' lack of involvement extended to legislative
matters. Officials of the Dukakis administration filed a
number of economic bills designed to be serious gestures to
show business their intention to improve the business climate.
Most of the bills had more than symbolic objectives and
included proposals that would provide venture capital to
community-based enterprises and innovative high technology
companies, permit the issuance of industrial revenue bonds to
rehabilitate and construct commercial and industrial
buildings, and eliminate unemployment compensation benefits
for those who voluntarily quit their jobs.
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Business leaders and trade association lobbyists, espe-
cially from AIM, were very interested in and actively lobbied
for the bill, which eventually became a law, limiting
unemloyment compensation benefits and cutting firm costs. But
the bill was designed to help existing businesses in the
state. Other bills, which more directly addressed the issue
of starting up new comdpanies and expanding the economic base,
were of little concern to the same group of businesspeople. 5
Effectiveness of Department
The business community was not the only group that had
little interest in the Department of Commerce and Development.
Legislators had a similar attitude. In 1975, the period of
the recession, when the economy was a major item in the
newspaper and unemployment rates were growing in the state,
many legislators sponsored economic development legislation.
Attendance at committee hearings that took testimony on the
bills was high, and legislators were very involved in the
drafting sessions on the proposals. But in 1978 and 1979,
the economy was on the rebound and legislative interest in the
economy waned. Except for the chairpersons, key staff members
5 The only exception to this rule was the active role of a
particular AIM lobbyist in getting a bill providing public
venture funds to innovative businesses through the
legislature. But he was acting more as a lobbyist for the
sponsoring agency of the bill, which temporarily hired him as
legal counsel, than as a representative for AIM.
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of the committee and a few administrative spokespersons, there
was little public participation in economic legislation, and
almost unlimited freedom for the committee to revise and
recommend business promotion proposals. For example, during
the 1978-79 legislative session, the two branches of the
legislature passed business development legislation approved
by Commerce and Labor Committee without a single roll call or
debate.
Legislators voted for economic development proposals for
their "symbol" rather than their substance. In the same way,
politicians believed the Department of Commerce and
Development's function was to show business that government
cared enough about the business climate to fund an agency to
watch over the business. Few believed that the department was
effective in its mission of expanding the economic base.
Because of this attitude, the caliber of the staff was not
important to them. Instead of trying to attract the most pro-
fessional staff to upgrade and improve the department's
performance, politicians saw the department as a place where
friends of politicians could find employment. It became, as
the Republicans feared, a "dumping ground" for Democratic
patronage.
Recent governors have made an effort to improve the
caliber of appointments. Although they have partly succeeded,
an attitude of defeat and scepticism both in and out of the
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department still prevailed. While Governor Dukakis was
publicly taking credit for the improvement in the state's eco-
nomy in 1978, a few subordinates were saying that the public
sector had little to do with the economy's upturn. But even
those in the Department of Commerce and Development who
thought that the state played a part in the economic expansion
believed that the impetus came from new legislation rather than
actions of their department. As one explained :
The agency is not very effective and cannot
really change the economy. [The] economy
[is] better partly because of legislative
changes which have done a lot to change the
climate some degree of improvement in the
(business) atmosphere. We have had some
success stories out there but of the 331
companies that expanded . . . (in 1978)
. . relatively few of them were critically
influenced by this department's efforts.
Conclusion
Implicit in this chapter is an assumption that business
promotion programs can, under specific conditions, be effec-
tively designed to expand a 'little' state's economic base.
In doing so, the chapter has shown that the inability of
the Department of Commerce and Development to separate itself
from the existing business community as a major reason for
its poor performance.
The chapter really has two conclusions. First is the
importance of the concept of comparative advantage in the for-
mulation of public policy in a 'little' state. Existing firms,
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especially high technology companies, did not want the department
to recruit out-of-state firms that could increase competition
for inputs and reduce their comparative advantage. In
addition, the chapter highlights the inability of a 'little'
state to even advance programs that expand the economy, as
long as these programs conflict with the needs of the existing
business community. Although everyone agreed the performance
of the development agency could have been improved, no one
interviewed felt comfortable about implementing programs that
alienated a segment of the local business community.
CHAPTER VI
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
Building upon the empirical research in the first five chap-
ters, Chapter Six provides a framework for understanding the for-
mation of economic policy in the 'little' state. It describes the
constraints and contraditions that define the process of governing
in a subnational economy.
The initial framework evolves from the structuralist tradi-
tion. Unlike pluralists, who assume that public policy is the
outcome of competition between interest groups and instrumenta-
lists, who explain the actions of the public sector through an
analysis of the needs of the business community, structuralists
explain policy decisions within the constraints of a capitalist
community.
The central themes of the three frameworks are quite
different. Pluralists and instrumentalists are most interested in
the relationship between public officials and interest groups.
The question to be answered is whether one group (instrumentists)
or several groups (pluralists) influence public policy. But
structuralists assume that the power relationship between elected
officials and interest groups is dependent upon the structure of
the economy. In a free market system, the objective of government
is to ensure the continuation of policies that maintain economic
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prosperity. While non-business interest groups have power in the
process, that power is defined and limited by economic constraints.
Examining the Hypothesis
The first chapter set forth three hypotheses about policy
formation in a 'little' state. Their appropriateness will be
analyzed in the context of the evidence presented about policy for-
mation in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
(1) The relative autonomy of elected officials.
The preceding chapters illustrate the importance of the elec-
torate in the decisionmaking process. When deciding upon a
policy, elected officials first consider the impact of the deci-
sion on voters--people who elect them to office. The business
community has influence only because of voter needs; the state can
only guarantee jobs and an adequate level of services to the elec-
torate if there is private enterprise.
Thus, elected officials must have prosperity to keep the
electorate content. As described in Chapter Two, elected offi-
cials assume the prosperity is a function of the business climate
in the little state; the more pro-business policies the greater
the likelihood that business will expand or start-up in a 'little'
state.
Politicians are also aware that business and the electorate
have conflicting demands. The electorate wants more protections
while business wants fewer regulations. Conflict threatens poli-
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ticians and they see their main task as minimizing the differences
that do exist.
To do this requires independence from special interests,
including the business community. But the independence is rela-
tive rather than absolute. Even if decisions would improve the
long-run prospects of the economy, legislators are unwilling to
implement programs opposed by members of the business community.
(An example of this situation is their unwillingness to have an
active business recruitment policy.) Instead, legislators see
their role as minimizing conflict, wherever it arises, and deve-
loping a consensus on narrow issues among different interest
groups.
(2) Businesses' demands for public programs are a function of
their stage of development.
The concept of comparative advantage plays an integral part
in the formulation of public policy in the 'little' state. 1
1Like many economic propositions, the concept of comparative
advantage is limited by its need to abstract from the more complex
and realistic process of change. Four factors can be cited which
reduce the usefulness of the concept to explain the composition of
firms in a 'little' state.
(a) The National Economy. A market depends upon the free
flow of goods and services across and within state borders. The
system is in part, additive and in part, reactive. In particular,
while the national economy is the sum total of the economies of
all states, each state's economy is also dependent upon and a
function of the level of prosperity of the nation-state. This is
important because national economic conditions can alter the
importance of the state's comparative advantage. For example,
firms will expand in a state that has lost its comparative advan-
tage if an increase in the demand for their products, a result of
the general upswing in the economy, offsets the increasing costs of
production.
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It rests on the validity of two separate phenomena that have not
been tested by the model--the presence of change in a market eco-
nomy and the movement of capital and labor between regions.
--Change in the Marketplace:
In competing among themselves for markets, firms go through
three stages of development. The first stage, innovation, is a
period in which an entrepreneur has a potentially profitable
technique not yet converted into the operation of an actual
enterprise. Those that begin operating go through the second
(Footnote 1 continued)
(b) A Lack of Equilibrium. Traditional economists assume
that the process of comparative advantage is self-equilibriating.
Their explanation is straightforward: firms locate in a region
that has advantages over other regions. This causes the demand
(and cost) for the region's resources to increase and its com-
parative advantage to decrease. At the same time, the region's
losing firms would increase their supply of idle resources,
resulting in a reduction in input costs and an increase in com-
parative advantage. But this analysis is based on the immobility
of resources. What if resources were as mobile as firms? Then
the result of an increased demand for resources in one region
would increase the supply rather than the price. Eventually one
region would become resource rich and the other resource poor.
Regional disparities would increase rather than diminish and there
would be no equilibrium.
(c) The Imperfect Firm. The theory of the firm is in itself
subject to serious criticism. Firms are not just profit
maximizers. Some are cost minimizers, risk averters or simply
guided by non-economic factors. For instance, even if the
situation clearly indicates that a move would be economically
beneficial, some firms remain where they are because their owners
consider non-economic factors, such as nearness to family or the
quality of the environment, to be of the highest priority.
(d) Public Intervention. Perhaps the key factor in the pro-
cess of comparative advantage is public intervention. Government
subsidies and programs affect a state's comparative advantage.
For instance, improving roads, spending money on public education
and raising money interest rates have enormous impacts on a
state's economy. Clearly, firms can gain significant rewards and
benefits if such public programs alter a state's comparative
advantage in a manner that most benefits them.
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stage, the growth stage, when they are expanding their output,
investment and employment. Eventually, innovative firms with even
more profitable techniques are started, creating conditions in
which growth firms become less efficient than their new competitors
and eventually die. This is the last stage, the stage of decline.
--Movement of Capital and Labor:
The process of firm growth and decline has geographical
characteristics. Every location has its own unique mix of assets
and liabilities. Assets differ. Some assets are natural like raw
materials. Others, like roads on the politico-economic environment,
are produced through the actions of the public sector. Still
others, like hydroelectric power, are natural resources converted
to productive use.
Geographic characteristics are important to our structuralist
framework because of the ability of capital and labor to move
across small regions and state. In a competitive marketplace,
ease of movement gives firms an incentive to locate in areas
possessing a mix of assets and liabilities which provide them with
a comparative advantage over their competitors. Because firms
making comparable products have similar needs, they are likely to
cluster in the same location. As a result, we should see a pat-
tern to the economic composition of 'little' states or regions.
Obviously, innovative firms (or more correctly, entrepreneurs
with innovative techniques) and growth forms will often find it in
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their interest to locate in areas with a comparative advantage.
But, as we have explained, growth firms eventually go through the
final stage of development and become technically obsolescent and
inefficient. While many of them die, some are able to exist as
marginal firms with a limited market and barely adequate profits.
Since there is often no advantage to relocating, they cluster in
the same area in which they grew.
The relationship between stages of development and geographi-
cal location provides an explanation of the different demands made
on the 'little' state by firms and their trade associations. For
example, the trade association in Masachusetts representing older
manufacturing firms advocated a business tax policy that reduces
the tax burden or the cost of doing business and offsets existing
inefficiencies. In contrast, the trade association representing
high technology growth firms preferred a business tax policy that
reduced personal taxes on the assumption that lower personal taxes
would induce skilled labor to move to the Commonwealth. Further,
high technology firms have lobbied against a state firm recruit-
ment policy because a successful program would increase the com-
petition for labor.
(3) Economic policy is the outcome of a consensus between
different interest groups.
Elected officials would like to please the electorate and
implement pro-business policies that improve the business climate
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but often demands conflict: not only do voters and businesses
want different policies but there is disagreement within each of
these communities.
In response, elected officials have institutionalized methods
to minimize conflict. One strategy is to limit conflict to
narrow issues that are of concern to a small segment of society.
Elected officials then use task forces and meetings with represen-
tative groups as forums for developing consensus over particular
issues. For instance, legislators have permitted two long-term
lobbying associations, one representing labor and one representing
business, sole power to formulate labor policy. In comparison,
environmental policy-making was done by task forces controlled by
the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs. In this situation,
the Secretary and her staff invited all interested parties,
including marginal and growth firms and their associations, to
participate on the representative committees.
'Little' states govern passively--by reaction rather than
action. The amount of interest group control of a particular
policy depends upon the issues and officials involved. Because of
officials' desire to maintain a healthy economy to serve con-
stitutents, satisfying the concerns of various segments of the
business community is ever present in the formulation of public
policy.2
2 The process of concensus in economic policy serves two addi-
tional purposes. The process helps to resolve conflict between
members of the business community so that they can be unified
around an economic policy that best advances their common
interests. The process also increases the participation of
interest groups in economic policy so that they have a larger
"stake" in the free market system.
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Even when the choice was satisfying the desire of the
existing business community to limit competition or attracting new
enterprise and advancing the long-run interests of the economy, as
in the formulation of business promotion policy in Massachusetts,
officials preferred to minimize conflicts. In fact, there is no
evidence that state officials willingly implement long-run reforms
that contradict the needs of existing interest groups.
Inferring a Dynamic Component to the Model
Minimizing conflict is, even under the best of conditions, a
difficult process. It is made more complicated when one considers
the relationship between interest group demands and economic
cycles. Unfortunately, the period of the research, 1975-80, is
too limited to do anything but speculate upon the dynamics of
policy formulation. During the period of research, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was on an upturn, moving out of a
serious recession marked by high unemployment and limited state
budgets and into a period of expansion.
There are several aspects of a dynamic model of policy for-
mulation in a 'little' state. First, conflict between businesses
is minimized in a dynamic model. In particular, the demands of
growth and marginal firms are a function of the economic cycles.
Marginal firms have the greatest need for public subsidies to
counteract limited profit rates when there is a recession and con-
sumer spending is down. Thus, newspaper accounts and interviews
with public officials provide evidence that AIM, the trade asso-
ciation for maginal industries, was the most active and influen-
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tial trade association between 1975 to 1977, during the end of the
recession. Towards 1978, when the economy started booming, the
association representing the high technology sector started to
exert more influence in public affairs. This is because periods
of expansion are accompanied by increases in private spending and
investment. Buoyed by the added demand, growth firms have a greater
need for scarce resources. In periods of expansion, then, growth
firms have additional needs for public subsidies and marginal
firms, helped by additional consumer spending, have fewer needs.
Thus, in the latter part of the 1970's, most of the legislature
efforts at formulating an economic policy were directed toward
programs to reduce personal income taxes and increase training
programs for people entering the high technology industry. In
periods of recession, the opposite happens: growth firms reduce
their demands and marginal firms increase their demands for public
service. Not surprisingly, the early seventies in Massachusetts
was a period when tax incentives received their greatest attention
at the state legislature.
While business conflict is minimized by business cycles,
politicians in a 'little' state do not fare as well when dealing
with conflicts between business and the electorate. This is
because the needs of marginal firms and the electorate--two types
of constituents--coincide in time. During periods of economic
expansion, growth firms have increased demands and constituents--
both marginal businesses and the electorate--have fewer. Public
officials are usually able to satisfy all interest groups in a
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period of a growing state budget. In contrast, during recessions,
state budgets are declining. Although growth firms have fewer
public sector demands, marginal firms need additional subsidies to
offset reductions in sales. At the same time, the electorate needs
more welfare, unemployment and social service programs to ease
the effect of rising unemployment. But with limited resources,
there is less to go around and consensus among interest groups,
especially marginal firms and the electorate, is more difficult to
achieve. Threatened with political defeat in a time of rising
constituent dissatisfaction, politicians obviously find it in
their interest to maintain the condition of prosperity.
There is one final dynamic aspect of the model. The very
success of this policy formulation in a 'little' state can lend to
future difficulties. The explanation for this contradiction lies
in the concept of comparative advantage. One of the outcomes of
the process of minimizing conflict is the continued existence of
marginal firms. Inputs that would normally be available for growth
firms are employed by marginal firms. There may not be a problem
during recessions, when growth firms limit their production. But
with economic expansion, marginal firms' employment of labor, capi-
tal and other inputs make it more difficult for growth firms to
acquire similar resources at a reasonable cost. To compensate,
growth firms will either pressure the public sector to implement
policies that increase the supply of needed resources or they will
grow elsewhere. In either case, the result distorts the alloca-
tion of resources in the market.
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Conclusion
The original purpose of this research was to test Fred
Block's theory of business-government relations. The structuralist
framework presented here is different from Block's theory in
several important ways. For instance, it eliminates his assumption
of the monolithic business community. The framework also contra-
dicts Block's thesis that government can go beyond the interest of
the business community to advance the interest of the economy as a
whole. While there may be sporadic examples of this phenomenon,
the more usual behavior of public officials is to balance the
demands of different interest groups in the economy. In doing
so, public officials are more interested in minimizing conflict
than in developing reforms that might induce economic prosperity.
This is an important point. Are Block and other struc-
turalists wrong to assume that policymakers can make judgments
independent of existing demands? Or is there a better explanation
that assumes different structuralist frameworks for different
levels of government? In particular, Block's theory may be
appropriate for the nation-state but inappropriate for the
'little' state.
Why would this be so? This study has made a distinction bet-
ween the constituent community and the electorate. The electorate
are voters who decide whether politicians stay in office. The
constituent community includes both the electorate and the
declining sector of the business community -- a sector which
assists elected officials to perform their jobs and get
re-elected. The fact that part of the business community is a
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member of an elected official's valued constituency makes it
impossible for him or her to go against the interest of at least a
part of the business community to implement economic reform. But
there may be other reasons. One possibility is that the intensity
of business involvement may not be the same at the two levels of
government. Existing businesses may find it easier to control a
small state legislature with a limited staff than a larger U.S.
Congress and may, in fact, have more power to influence policy at
the lower level. It might also be that government officials have
different views about the effects of their decisions. For
example, state officials are obviously aware that capital moves
more easily across state borders. 3 Because of this, they may be
more reluctant to alienate the private sector than federal offi-
cials who have greater powers to control capital and the location
of industry.
3 The analysis implies that the flow of capital determines the
flow of labor, and this is why public officials are more concerned
about firm relocation than skilled labor migration. While not the
most common assumption, this cause-and-effect relationship has is
often used to explain regional change. During the 1970's, for
example, the Northeast region and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, in particular, experienced a substantial migration
of poeple to the western, north central and southern parts of the
country. The explanation for this phenomena is typically that the
two recessions of the 1970's, which were longer lasting and more
severe in the state than elsewhere, created the conditions by
which the labor force decided to move to regions with more
available and better paying employment. For typical studies of
this kind, see Massachusetts Division of Employment Security,
Population and Labor Force Projections for Massachusetts, Labor
Area Research Publication (Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
Government Printing Office, 1980), and Bernard Weinstein and
Robert Firestone, The Rise of the Sunbelt and the Decline of the
Northeast (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978).
-172-
In conclusion, the structure of the formulation of economic
policy in a market economy may be different at each level of
government. The key variables are the size of a region and the
powers of a government to control the flow of capital. With no
powers to control capital at the 'little' state level of govern-
ment and the relative ease of firm relocation, the objective of
economic policy has become one of minimizing conflict while
satisfying the needs of the existing business community.
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APPENDIX V
People Interviewed for the Study
Robert Barry, Massachusetts Legislature
Representative Royal Bolling, Jr.
Senator John Brennan
Representative Thomas Brownell
Senator Anna Buckley
Representative John Businger
Sarah Carroll, Office of Coastal Zone Management
William Chouinard, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce
Representative Gerald Cohen
Representative Nicholas Costello
John Crosier, Department of Commerce and Development
Robert Cummings, Monsanto Company
David Danning, Office of Economic Affairs
Warren Dillon, Department of Commerce and Development
John Dolan, Massachusetts Legislature
Governor Michael Dukakis
Lauwrence Fitzmaurice, Department of Revenues
Senator John Fitzpatrick
Representative Barney Frank
Representative Robert Gillette
Alex Gordon, Department of Revenues
Representative John Gray
David Hakanson, Department of Commerce and Development
Senator Robert Hall
Senator Kevin Harrington
David Harris, Department of Commerce and Development
Senator Kevin Harrington
David Harris, Department of Commerce and Development
John Hodgman, Department of Employment Security
Deborah Howard, Audubon Society
Ralph Jordan, State Employment Training Council
Representative Raymond Jordan
Joseph Kane, Department of labor and Industries
Robert Kane, Department of Revenues
Andrew Kariotis, Alpha Industries
Richard Kendall, Department of Environmental Management
Representative Melvin King
Joseph Lawless, Massachusetts Legislature
Senator Michael LoPresti
Representative John Loring
Representative Thomas Lussier
Senator Robert McCarthy
William McCarthy, Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Senator Allan McKinnon
Terence McLarney, Massachusetts Law Reform
Thomas McLaughlin, Department of Environment Quality Engineering
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Representative John Menard
Nicholas Metaxas, Department of Revenue
Walter Meuther, Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Representative David Mofenson
K. Heinz Muehlmann, Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Evelyn Murphy, Office of Environmental Affairs
Representative John Murphy
Representative Mary Murphy
Representative Andrew Natsio
Representative John McNeil
Representative Thomas Norton
Senator John Olver
Frank O'Neill, Department of Commerce and Development
Representative Kevin Porier
Representative William Robinson
Eleanor Rowe, Department of Employment Security
Representative Michael Ruane
Senator William Saltonstall
Fred Schlosstein, Massachusetts Legislature
Representative Richard Silva
Senator Allan Sisisky
Jim Sledd, Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Howard Smith, Office of Economic Affairs
James Snow, Department of Labor and Industries
Representative Theodore Speliotis
Dan Travers, Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
Suzanne Tompkins, Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
Joan Tuttle, Consultant
Michael Ventresca, Office of Environmental Affairs
Frank Wezniak, Adar/Associates
Representative Bruce Wetherbee
John White, Department of Revenues
Representative Paul White
Representative Francis Woodward
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